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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal, pursuant to Rule 26, Section 
77-35-26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rule 3, Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, taken from the final judgment of 
conviction entered by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Third 
District Court, Coalville, following the conditional plea of 
guilty entered by Appellant to the charge of Distribution of a 
Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony, which plea reserved 
in Appellant the right to appeal from the same court's denial of 
his Motion to Suppress the Evidence against him as to all charges 
in the Information below. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. Does a private citizen become an agent of the 
police in impermissibly searching and seizing the property of 
another pursuant to a continuing pattern of similar searches and 
seizures in which the said citizen would become an active under-
cover agent of the police in the ensuing investigation? 
2. If a private citizen obtains evidence from an 
impermissible search of another's property and thereafter offers 
to turn it over to the police, must the police first obtain a 
warrant for the seizure thereof? 
3. Where an underlying affidavit fails to articulate 
any objective facts other than a suspect's remote personal 
possession of narcotics, can the issuance of a search warrant for 
his residence be constitutionally justified? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for 
Distribution of a Controlled Substance (marijuana), a Third 
Degree Felony, pursuant to Appellant's conditional plea of guilty 
to the said charge before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
Third District Court, Summit County, Utah, which enabled Appel-
lant to retain his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress the evidence against him as a condition of the plea. 
Appellant was originally charged with four counts of 
violating the Controlled Substance Act by Information dated 
September 27, 1988. (R. 0002-0004.) 
Count I charged Distribution of a Controlled Substance 
in violation of 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), Utah Code Annotated, the sole 
charge for which Appellant stands convicted. 
The remaining counts were II Possession with Intent to 
Distribute, 58-37-8, a Third Degree Felony; III Unlawful Pos-
session of Marijuana Without Tax Stamps Affixed, 59-19-106(2), a 
Third Degree Felony; and IV Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, 
58-37-8(5) (a), a Class B Misdemeanor. 
A preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable 
Maurice Jones, Third Circuit Court, Summit County, on November 
15, 1988. The matter was bound over to the Third District Court, 
same date, and Appellant was arraigned in said court on December 
7, 1988, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding. The case was 
assigned to Judge Frederick. (R. 0037.) 
Appellant, on January 13, 1989, filed a "Motion to 
Suppress Evidence as to all Counts and to Dismiss Count III on 
other Grounds" with accompanying Memorandum of Points and Author-
ities, exhibits and transcripts of prior proceedings. (R. 
0041-0202.) 
On February 1, 1989, the State filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition (to Appellant's Motion.) (R. 0203-0230.) 
Appellant's Motion to Suppress/Dismiss came on for 
hearing before Judge Frederick on February 6, 1989, and following 
arguments of counsel, was denied ijn tpto. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order(s) 
denying Appellant's Motion were filed by the court on March 6, 
1989. (R. 0246-0255.) 
From March 9 to 23, 1989, the parties filed a flurry of 
pleadings, motions, memoranda, affidavits and responses thereto 
respecting reconsideration or rehearing of Appellant's Motion, 
objections to proposed language, in limine relief and the like. 
(R. 0233-0245; 0257-0281.) 
The said pleadings and addenda were incorporated into 
the record by mutual agreement of the parties and the disputed 
issues were settled by the court's approval of proposed plea 
bargain dispositions of all matters, including the charges 
against Appellant which would allow Appellant to enter a plea of 
guilty to Count I but reserve the right to withdraw his plea in 
the event his appeal was successful as to suppression of the 
evidence in Count I. It further granted him the right to appeal 
issues dispositive of the remaining counts which were to be 
dismissed without prejudice. 
The matter came on for change of plea on May 1, 1989f 
before Judge Frederick. 
By mutual agreement of the parties and approval of the 
trial court, Appellant entered a conditional plea of guilty to 
Count I and Counts II through IV were dismissed, subject to the 
following terms and conditions: 
1. Defendant reserved the right to appeal from the 
court's denial of his pre-trial motions regarding dismissal 
and/or suppression of evidence as to any count or issues present-
ed therein; 
2. Affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the order 
denying suppression of the evidence in Count I bars prosecution 
of any other count; 
3. Reversal of the said order dispositive of Count I 
results in: 
a. Withdrawal of Defendant's plea of guilty thereto; 
b. The right of the State to refile and prosecute any 
or all of Counts II through IV not otherwise barred 
from prosecution by the Court of Appeals1 decision 
herein or for any other legal reason. 
On June 5, 1989, Appellant was sentenced to a term of 
0-5 years and the sentence suspended with the Appellant placed on 
probation subject to conditions which included, inter alia, a 
short jail term. (See Judgment and Commitment form, filed June 
19, 1989, at R. 0299-0302.) 
The facts which underlie the charges against Appellant 
involve the following principle characters: Appellant, a resi-
dent of Hoytsville, Utah, located approximately seven miles from 
Park City; his wife Jeanne Murphy; Lee Ford, who is the own-
er/manager of a nationally franchised parcel packaging and 
mailing business known as "Handle With Care" (hereinafter, 
"Store"), in Park City, Utah, which acts as a pre-packaged parcel 
forwarder for its customers through such carriers as "Federal 
Express" and "UPS," and, for an additional charge, will also 
package unwrapped items before forwarding them as secure parcels. 
(The "Store", and others like it, will only insure package 
contents where the "Store" packages and forwards.); Mary Ford, a 
detective with the Park City Police Department who is also the 
wife of Lee Ford; and Patrick Pirraglio, a Detective-Lieutenant, 
(and Mary Fordfs supervisor), with the Park City Police 
Department 
About 9:00 a.m., September 19, 1988, Defendant Murphy 
entered the "Store" and requested Lee Ford to send a pre-packaged 
(by Murphy) parcel to a California addressee, representing the 
contents to be homemade dog biscuits. Both Defendant and Mr. 
Ford were aware from a rattling noise that "dog biscuits" were 
loose inside the package and even discussed the fact; however, 
Defendant stated to Ford that he wanted the package sent "as is." 
Lee Ford agreed to send it "as is." Ford did not seek permission 
to rewrap or repack the said package, nor was an extra charge for 
such added services discussed or paid. (R. 307: Transcript of 
Murphy Preliminary Hearing; pp. 6, 7, 8, 12 and 13.) (Cited 
infra as "Murphy Tr."). 
Nor was the package insured. (Id.) 
A Federal Express Air Bill was prepared and Defendant 
paid Mr. Ford the exact sum for the "shipping only" service. 
(Id.) After Defendant departed, and without seeking or receiving 
Defendant's permission or authority, Lee Ford opened the package 
and searched the contents thereof, finding approximately 5 1/2 
ounces of marijuana. (Id. 16, 17.) 
Ford testified he did not suspect Defendant's package 
contained contraband. (R. 307; p. 8, 21-22.) However, his wife 
(Detective Mary Ford) testified that he clearly expressed suspi-
cion as the reason for his search. (R. 307; p. 42-43.) (See 
also, R. 199-202. ) 
Later that morning, another package was brought to the 
"Store" by a Mr. Arne Anderson, (totally unrelated), which Mr. 
Ford suspected might contain contraband and which he also opened 
without the owner's authority and, in which, he also found 
marijuana. (Id. 20, 21, 27; Transcript of Anderson Preliminary 
Hearing, infra, generally.) 
About 12:20 p.m., same date, Mr. Ford telephoned his 
wife, Detective Mary Ford, concerning both packages. She came to 
the store and picked up both items of evidence and obtained from 
her husband his version of the facts, (Id. 8f 9, £t. seg.) 
Since Lee Ford had no information concerning Defendant 
Murphy other than his possible home phone number, Park City and 
Summit County officers began attempts to identify and locate 
Defendant, eventually determining his name and residential 
address. (Id., 15, 53, 54.) 
However, detectives had no other information concerning 
Murphy to corroborate Mr. Fordfs allegation about the package nor 
to connect Defendant to any other marijuana; nor was there any 
information derived from Mr. Ford or any other source who claimed 
or even opined that marijuana was, or had been, in the Murphy 
residence at any time. (Id., 53, 54, 60, 61, 65, 68.) 
Based solely on the information told to him by Detective 
Ford, (which was told to her by Lee Ford), Detective Pirraglio 
prepared an affidavit for a search warrant, supplementing the 
same with a description and address of the Murphy residence, 
learned from later investigation. He then appeared before Judge 
Michael Murphy on September 20, 1988, and swore under oath to the 
veracity of the affidavit at which time Judge Murphy signed the 
warrant which also authorized "night-time" and "no-knock" exe-
cution. 
That same evening Detectives Pirraglio, Ford and other 
officers searched the Murphy home pursuant to the search warrant, 
whereupon Detective Ford immediately found a "Sender1s Copy" of a 
Federal Express airbill in plain view on the kitchen table. (R. 
307; p. 36, 37. ) 
Thereafter, the entire home was searched resulting in 
the seizure of, inter alia, quantities of marijuana, parapher-
nalia associated therewith and various envelopes containing 
handwritten letters, a "price list", currency and other 
evidentiary items. (See two page "Inventory," at R. 0093-0094.) 
A copy of the official transcript of the preliminary 
hearing concerning the aforementioned unconnected but factually 
similar case, held October 4, 1988, (State of Utah v. Arne Glenn 
Anderson, Case No. 88-CR-153), is included in the record at R. 
308.) 
Including Defendant Murphy and the above referenced Arne 
Anderson, both of whom were charged due to Lee Ford's searches of 
their respective packages on the same date, (September 19, 1988), 
Lee Ford has admittedly made four prior seizures of controlled 
substances under near identical circumstances. (And has made a 
considerable number of unsuccessful searches of suspicious 
packages with the express purpose of looking for drugs. (R. 307; 
pp. 22, 25, 26, 27, 28; Anderson Tr., generally.) The owners 
never knew of the searches. (Id.) 
One such search occurred on June 13, 1988, and another, 
September 2, 1988. In each case, pre-wrapped packages were given 
to Ford only for forwarding, exact fees were paid and no 
re-packaging was discussed. (Id.) 
The June 13th instance, according to Ford, resulted from 
his decision (without the owner's knowledge or permission) to 
re-wrap a package, (by removing duct tape which bound it), in 
order to make it fit into a mailing envelope. He "inadvertently" 
discovered cocaine in the process. The September 2nd discovery 
was apparently based on his belief that the sender looked suspi-
ciously like a drug trafficker. (Id.) 
In both cases, Mr. Ford was actively involved in the 
follow up investigation, (undercover), in concert with the police 
by "losing" the packages and arranging to supply the senders with 
false stories in order to entice them into revealing their 
identity and location, or, if possible, to coax them into person-
ally appearing for remuneration (for a "lost" package), or 
"further tracing." (R. 308, pp. 34-38.) 
There is no dispute that Mr. Ford was an active partic-
ipant with the police in each of these earlier investigations 
with the mutual intent of identifying, apprehending and prosecut-
ing the offenders through their joint law enforcement actions. 
(Id.) 
In every case involving a seizure, including this one, 
Lee Ford's notification of "the police" was in fact made directly 
to his wife, Detective Mary Ford. Detectives Ford and Pirraglio 
both participated with Lee Ford in the follow-up investigations. 
(And prosecutions, where initiated.) (R. 307 and 308, general-
ly.) 
In addition to his four fruitful searches between June 
13th and September 19th, Lee Ford testified on October 4, 19 8, 
that he had previously opened "50" packages, (R. 308, p. 15, 1. 
22), without finding any illegal, controlled substances. (Howev-
er, at the Appellantfs preliminary hearing, six weeks later, Ford 
said he had previously searched only "12" such packages without 
success. (R. 307, p. 26.) 
Mr. Ford further stated that he had not received permis-
sion from the owners/senders to open any of the 12 to 50 unseized 
packages nor the four seized ones. None of the search victims 
were charged for any repackaging service nor any other customary 
cost other than pre-packaged shipping. (Id., 27, et seq.) 
Mr. Ford denied receiving any active encouragement from 
his wife or any other police officer to initiate or to continue 
searches of packages but admitted his active undercover par-
ticipation would alv/ays follow in each of the ensuing inves-
tigations. Neither did any officer discourage him from continued 
searches or express disapproval or otherwise demonstrate concern 
over the propriety of his searches. (R. 307; 308, throughout.) 
Mr. Ford testified at the Anderson hearing that he was 
always "ready, willing and able" to assist in the investigations 
he initiated for the police and discussed with them his investi-
gative participation to follow. Ke said that the police general-
ly disregarded his suggestions of how to apprehend the offenders 
and that he followed the instructions of the police officers 
concerning his assigned role. (R. 308, p. 27-29.) 
Mr. Ford also testified that he was performing the 
searches in keeping with the policies and procedures of the 
national company which franchises his store, (and for the purpose 
of preventing "losing his business" by unwittingly shipping 
illegal drugs.) He confirmed that the said policies were the 
"guidelines" published by the "Handle With Care" "main office". 
(R. 308, p. 25; R. 307, p. 23, 24.) 
Although the conditional plea herein reserves the right 
to appeal all of the courts final orders denying Appellant's 
motions, Appellant seeks relief herein only from the search and 
seizure of his parcel by Lee Ford which is the evidence in Count 
I, (Arguments I and II, infra, address that matter); and, from 
the evidence found pursuant to the issuance and execution of the 
search warrant herein which are directly or derivatively disposi-
tive of Counts II, III and IV. (Argument III, infra.) 
Other issues raised in arguments below are not ad-
dressed here since the "fruit of the poisoned tree" doctrine 
would clearly dispose of all counts in the Information should the 
Appellant prevail on the issues in Arguments I or II and would 
dispose of all but Count I if the court were to find the search 
warrant invalid per Argument III. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. The court should have suppressed the evidence which 
supports Count I; i.e., the 5 1/2 ounces of marijuana found by 
Lee Ford, since the pattern of conduct established by him and the 
police and his attendant expectations and the tacit encouragement 
of the police of Ford's continued searches created an agency 
relationship which required Ford, as a government operative, to 
abide by the same constitutional constraints against warrantless 
searches which apply to the police. 
II. Even if the court finds that Lee Ford was not the 
agent of the police when he searched Appellant's parcel, when he 
turned it over to the police, the police were aware it was the 
property of another who had an expectation of privacy, and, even 
though they may have had probable cause to seize the property, 
there was no exigent circumstance which precluded them from first 
obtaining a search warrant so the evidence as to Count I is the 
inadmissible fruits of a warrantless seizure. 
III. The affidavit in support of the search warrant 
identified Appellant as being the person whose parcel was 
searched by Ford, revealing illegal drugs and it asserted that 
Appellant resided in a house seven miles distant. It did not 
contain one objective fact which could support a finding of 
probable cause to justify issuance of a search warrant for that 
residence since there was no information articulated which could 
create a nexus between the parcel and the residence or could 
knowledgeably suggest that additional drugs were located therein. 
Therefore, the trial court should have found insufficient justi-
fication for issuance of the warrant and suppressed the evidence 
directly seized by execution of the warrant and any which was 
derivative thereof. Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1971). 
ARGUMENTS 
I. LEE FORD WAS ACTING AS AN AGENT 
OF THE POLICE WHEN HE SEARCHED DEFENDANT'S 
PACKAGE AND THEREFORE SUPPRESSION OF 
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED THEREBY IS WARRANTED 
In the classic informer/agent scenario where the police 
officer actively encourages the informer to gather evidence 
illegally, the agency relationship is clearly established and the 
"private" search is, in fact, a Government search requiring a 
warrant with the usual constitutional safeguards. In other 
words, if Lee Ford or the officers herein admitted to active 
guidance or encouragement in the opening of these packages, the 
court would surely suppress the fruits of Lee Ford's search of 
Defendant's package. U.S. v. Walter, 477 U.S. 649 (1980); U.S. 
v. Mulder, 808 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1987); State v. Boynton, 574 
P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1978) . 
The distinction begins to blur when the informer is 
acting informally "in concert" with the police or becomes imbued 
with government involvement through a past pattern of conduct, 
mere tacit governmental encouragement or governmental approval 
through implications or expressions of appreciation and/or 
acquiescence to an apparent course of conduct which takes on the 
look of a "quasi-private" officer. This theory is similar to a 
civil theory of contract by estoppel. I.e., if the private agent 
continues to provide a service which the government doesn't 
terminate, at some point, the officials cannot deny the existence 
of an "implied contract." 
Evidence gathered from a search by a private person is 
subject to the exclusionary rule "if ostensible private" activity 
becomes so imbued with governmental involvement that the actor, 
in essence, becomes an agent of the government irrespective of 
the stated or actual intent of the actor or the government. 
People v. DeSantis, 399 NYS2d 514 (NY 1977). 
Privately obtained evidence (from a warrantless search) 
is inadmissible if the government "in any way" encourages or 
participates in the activity. State v. Villagomez, 44 Ohio 
App.2d 209 (Ohio 1974). 
Whenever a private citizen participates in the planning 
or implementing of joint activity with law enforcement which 
infringes upon Fourth Amendment rights or assists in the further-
ance of the operation, the private citizen exemption no longer 
applies. People v. Scott, 43 Cal. App. 3d 723 (1974). 
Furthermore, not only will the fruits of the private 
citizen's search be suppressed, any search warrant obtained as a 
result of the evidence gained from the initial search is tainted, 
as well. Boynton, supra, at 1333. 
If police are aware of the likelihood of ongoing search 
activities by a "would be" police officer-citizen, there is 
created an expectation that a pattern of similar searches will 
continue and police will be recipients of seized evidence other-
wise unavailable to them by legal means. In such cases the 
exclusionary rule applies since police cannot "stand idly by." 
Stapleton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 447 P.2d 967 
(1968). 
II. EVEN IF THE SEARCH WAS LAWFUL AS A VALID 
PRIVATE CITIZEN EXCEPTION, THE WARRANTLESS 
SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT'S PACKAGE BY 
THE POLICE WAS UNLAWFUL 
If the court were to find that Lee Ford acted as a 
purely private citizen in opening and searching Defendant's 
package it must nevertheless hold that the seizure of the package 
by the police, from Lee Ford, was a governmental violation of the 
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, (and Article I, 
Section XIV, Constitution of Utah) rights requiring suppression 
of the evidence contained therein since no warrant was first 
obtained. 
In a strikingly similar case, a parcel service's loss 
prevention manager, while conducting routine loss prevention 
inspections, opened a randomly selected package and found illegal 
material. Since he had no involvement with the police to that 
stage, the court held the search itself to be a lawful private 
search. However, upon his notifying the FBI of the material, the 
FBI took custody of the package from the manager without first 
obtaining a warrant. In that case, (as in this), although the 
parcel service consented tof indeed requested, the FBIfs King 
custody from them, there were no exigent circumstances wu ch 
precluded the FBI's obtaining a search warrant. The cc t held 
that the seizure by the FBI was unconstitutional withe: a 
warrant and suppressed the evidence. U.S. v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 
1365 (8th Cir. 1976). Simply because the owner of the property 
isn't the possessor and is unaware of the intent to seize does 
not relieve the warrant requirement since the private possessor 
has no authority to consent and no exigent circumstance can arise 
from these facts. 
In Walter, supra, the identical result was reached on 
the same sort of facts; i.e., private citizens opened cartons, 
called for the FBI and gave the evidentiary contents to the FBI 
who accepted them without a warrant. Held: The citizens1 search 
and seizure was legal; the FBI seizure was not; ergo, sup-
pression. 
Under the same factual circumstances, police officers 
are allowed to "field test" the substance to bolster probable 
cause before seeking a warrant, (U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 
(1984); People v. Yackee, 161 Cal. App. 3d 843 (1984)); however, 
removing the substance from the premises for a full "lab test" is 
a seizure and the evidence must be suppressed. Mulder, supra. 
In this case the police made the warrantless "seizure" 
from a willing Mr. Ford then delivered the evidence to the crime 
lab for an examination. No field tests were done at the "Store." 
III. ALL EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO OR DERIVATIVE 
OF THE SEARCH WARRANT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED DUE TO 
VIOLATIONS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 
A. DETECTIVE PIRRAGLIOfS AFFIDAVIT 
WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE 
CAUSE FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT 
Both Article I, Section XIV, Utah Constitution, and the 
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (including interpre-
tations thereof by the courts) require that search warrants be 
issued based only upon "probable cause" supported by "oath or 
affirmation" detailing sufficiently quantitative and material, 
objective facts within the personal knowledge of a credible 
witness particularly and narrowly describing the things to be 
seized, the place to be searched and objective bases as to "v/hy" 
the "things" are known to presently be in the said place. (The 
nexus.) (Citations, infra.) 
Until the "totality of the circumstances" test was 
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213 (1983), regarding affidavits based upon informant informa-
tion, both the federal and Utah courts adhered to the 
"two-pronged" Aguillar-Spinelli standard in determining the 
existence of probable cause by whether, (1) sufficient "underly-
ing circumstances" were set forth in an affidavit to support the 
validity of the informant's conclusion, and (2) the affiant can 
(in the affidavit) demonstrate that the informant is "reliab " 
and "credible". Aguillar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and 
Spinelli v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
By adopting the Gates standard, the U.S. Supreme Court 
rejected the two pronged test. However, the Utah courts, al-
though adopting the Gates standard in State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 
1258 (1983), retained the Aguillar-Spinelli test to the degree 
necessary "to (fairly) establish . . . that the evidence sought 
actually exists and can be found where the informant states", 
(Emphasis added) and required application of that test to each 
affidavit seeking a warrant with, "the weight deemed prudent." 
State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (1984). 
Beginning with Anderton in 1983 and continuing until 
the recent decision by the Court of Appeals in State v. Ayala, 93 
Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (October 14, 1988), Utah courts have followed a 
consistent line as to the "Aguillar-Spinelli-Gates" probable 
cause standard. (See Anderton, Bailey and Ayala, supra; State v. 
Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420 (1986); State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 
(1987); and, State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah App. 1987). 
The consistencies include: 
1. Confirming the reliability of the informant and 
credibility of the information through corroborative means such 
as additional informants, surveillance, follow-up undercover 
activities such as purchases, etc. 
2. Affirming the known existence of specific evidence 
presently located in a particular place within a reasonably short 
time period prior, but contemporaneous, to the sworn application 
for the warrant, 
3. Presentation of objective facts by affidavit to 
support the very issuance of a warrant and the particular author-
ity regarding execution thereof; i.e., "no-knock", etc., based 
upon more than innocuous (consistent also with innocence) facts 
or boiler-plate assertions. 
4. The absence of attenuated conclusions or specu-
lation to provide the nexus between the place to be searched and 
the likely presence of the things to be seized. 
5. Strict confinement of the scope of the warrant!s 
authority to affidavit's facts; scope of execution to warrant's 
authority. 
In all the above cited cases, the warrants were found 
to be sufficiently supported by probable cause; however, the 
affidavit in this case falls far short of the facts held suffi-
cient in the others. 
In comparison: 
1. Anderton - the affidavit attested to the 
informant's extensive history of providing accurate information; 
said the informant had recently seen the marijuana in a particu-
lar location in the Defendant's residence; that extensive 
discussions between affiant and informant corroborated lengthy, 
recent and ongoing marijuana activity at the residence. 
The court reasoned that there was a "fair probability" 
based upon objective knowledge that the specified evidence would 
be found in that "particular place." At 1261. 
2. Bailey: The affidavit established the informant's 
past history of veracity and reliability with specific facts; 
said that the informant gave affiant a detailed description of 
Defendant's apartment and the stolen property which he had 
personally observed therein; said that the affiant had indepen-
dently confirmed that the property matched the description of 
items recently stolen; said that the affiant corroborated the 
accuracy of the defendant's purported statements to the informant 
regarding details of the robbery; said that the affiant's in-
dependent investigation of both the defendant and informant 
corroborated the defendant's "M.O." and verified other of the 
informant's claims. 
The court held that a warrant should not issue unless 
the court believes that the specified evidence "can be found 
where the informant states," irrespective of the known fact of 
the defendant's possession of said evidence elsewhere. At 1205. 
(Emphasis added. ) 
3. Espinoza; Affidavit set forth that two informants, 
one with a previous history of providing reliable information, 
each with personal observations of drug sales (inside defendant's 
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residence) which corroborated the other; affiant's simultaneous 
investigation confirmed claims of defendant's recent "drug 
purchasing run" to Colorado; police surveillance confirmed 
extraordinary traffic at residence by known drug buyers/users; 
and final confirmation through an undercover, "controlled" drug 
purchase from the defendant inside the place to be searched, just 
prior to the application for the warrant. 723 P.2d 420. (Empha-
sis added.) 
4. Hansen: Affidavit contained sworn assertions of 
informant's past and frequent history of supplying specific 
factual, truthful information; personal observations of large 
quantities of drugs presently inside the place to be searched and 
of defendant's overt multiple sales thereat; affiant's personal 
knowledge of defendant's well-known past and present drug busi-
ness; additional factual confirmation of specific drugs being 
presently inside defendant's apartment just prior to issuance of 
warrant. 732 P.2d 127. 
5. Miller: Averment describing lengthy surveillance 
of residence and intensive investigation of residents activities 
following reported observations of numerous informant/neighbors 
which provided at least eleven categories and numerous 
sub-categories of objective facts to support warrant to search 
said premises for marijuana cultivation operation. 740 P.2d 
1363. 
6. Ayala: Affidavit described two independent 
informants, one reporting long-term personal observations of 
heroin sales from defendant's residence; the otherir recent sales 
thereat, and "as undercover agent," made a final "controlled drug 
purchase" at same suspect residence; attested that both were 
reliable in the past (with specifics) and that affiant continu-
ously and personally observed similar events within seven days of 
the warrant's issuance. 93 U.A.R. 13. 
In the above cases, the informants1 reliability and 
history were attested to, (with objective factual information), 
in the affidavit. There are two reasons, at least, why Mr. 
Ford's credibility, in this instance, was not sworn to: (1) the 
affiant never even spoke with Mr. Ford and had no knowledge of 
his credibility, concluding he was credible solely due to his 
marriage to a police officer, (R. 307, p. 68.) He reported only 
the hearsay relayed to him by Mrs. Ford; (2) Even if credible, 
Mr. Ford had not one shred of information about the Murphy 
residence or, (aside from the parcel matter), about Murphy, 
therefore his credibility is academic. 
Also, unlike the above cases, here there are no con-
trolled buys, corroborative investigations of drug activity, 
in-residence personal observations nor surveillances. There was 
not even any hearsay, rumors or prior suspicions to even suggest 
that the place to be searched would contain any type of evidence, 
not to mention particularly described items. No informant nor 
investigator had any information about Defendant's history or a 
nexus between the package and his residence. They only knew that 
he had a residence. The affidavit does not even attempt to 
assert any factual connection with the home and any drugs. 
Affirming on this point would be so ludicrous as to 
render the Fourth Amendment a nullity. It would require only two 
sworn facts to find an affidavit sufficient: 
(1) "Defendant recently possessed (albeit not in the 
home) drugs."; 
(2) "Defendant's address is 985 South, West Hoytsville 
Road." 
The Pirraglio affidavit "said": "Defendant had mari-
juana in Park City, Utah, yesterday. He lives at )( address in 
Hoytsville." 
It is absolutely clear that the warrant herein must be 
suppressed and, with it, all evidence seized pursuant thereto or 
derived therefrom. 
B. THE COURT GRANTED EVEN GREATER INVASIONS 
OF PRIVACY WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE 
Irrespective of the error in granting the search 
warrant in the first instance, had there been sufficient probable 
cause for its issuance, the issuing court had no probable cause 
to grant the further and more intrusive authority to the police 
that it did. 
The court is empowered to allow a search warrant to be 
executed in the nighttime based upon the sworn averments of 
affiant that there is probable cause, based upon his personal 
knowledge of objective facts, that destruction of evidence, 
endangerment of officers, etc., may otherwise occur. Likewise, 
when such risks increase, a "no-knock" may issue. (77-23-5, Utah 
Code Annotated.) 
In the instant warrant, both powers are granted even 
though the affidavit is silent as to any such objective factual 
claims. At best one might imply from conclusory language of a 
pro forma nature that such authority is necessary; however, not 
one fact is set forth to support any such notion. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should reverse the denial of Appellant's 
motion to suppress the fruits of the "private" search of his 
parcel thereby disposing of Count I, if not all counts by virtue of 
Wong Sun, supra. 
The court should also find that there were insufficient 
facts contained in the affidavit to justify issuance of the 
search warrant herein; therefore, no evidence in Counts II, III 
and IV should be admitted in the event said counts are refiled, 
thereby barring prospective prosecution. 
DATED this /f5*) day of October., ,1989. 
i 
^9Wt F . >DfeLAL- . 
At torney fo r Appel lan t 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Q ? ^ day of October, 
1989, four true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed, 
with postage prepaid fully thereon, to the Utah Attorney General, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 8411,4 
4^ 
ADDENDUM 
A-l DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
A-2 ORDER RE: EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE DOCKETING STATEMENT 
A-3 MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE DOCKETING 
STATEMENT 
A-4 STAY OF SENTENCE AND CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
A-5 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
A-6 JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
A-7 STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
A-8 ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
A-9 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
A-10 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RE-HEARING 
A-ll COURT'S DECISION 
A-12 DEFENDANT'S REPLY RE: MOTION IN LIMINE 
A-13 DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE RE: 
OBJECTIONS 
A-14 PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
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A-16 PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
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A-18 MOTION IN LIMINE 
A-l9 OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
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20 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
21 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
22 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
23 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT III 
OF THE INFORMATION 
24 OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RE-HEARING 
25 OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
26 AFFIDAVIT OF PAT PIRRAGLIO 
27 AFFIDAVIT OF LOUIS A. STEVENS 
28 MOTION FOR REHEARING 
29 MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY PER RULE 16 
30 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS AND DISMISS 
31 MOTION TO EXPAND LENGTH OF MEMORANDUM 
3 2 MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AS TO ALL COUNTS AND TO 
DISMISS COUNT III ON OTHER GROUNDS 
33 PRE-TRIAL RELEASE ORDER 
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'i' Prohibited act? A — Penalties 
(a> Except as authorized by thi» chapter, it is 
unlawful for any person to knowingly and inten-
tionally; 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or 
to possess with intent to produce, manufac-
ture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or ar-
range to distribute a controlled or counter-
feit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the 
course of his business as a sales representa-
tive of a manufacturer or distributor of sub-
stances listed in Schedules II through V ex-
cept under an order or prescription; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance with intent to distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or 
II is guilty of a second degree felony and 
upon a second or subsequent conviction of 
Subsection (lKa) is guilty of a first degree 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III 
or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third de-
gree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection 
is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third de-
gree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to possess or use a controlled sub-
stance, unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order or directly from a prac-
titioner while acting in the course of his pro-
fessional practice, or as otherwise authorized 
by this subsection; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or per-
son in control of any building, room, tene-
ment, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place, 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them 
to be occupied by persons unlawfully possess-
ing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances in any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to be present where controlled sub-
stances are being used or possessed in viola-
tion of this chapter and the use or possession 
is open, obvious, apparent, and not concealed 
from those present; however, a person may 
not be convicted under this subsection if the 
evidence shows that he did not use the sub-
stance himself or advise, encourage, or assist 
anyone else to do so; any incidence of prior 
unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this de-
fense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally to possess an altered or forged pre-
scription or written order for a controlled 
substance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this 
chapter knowingly and intentionally to pre-
scribe, administer, or dispense a controlled 
substance to a juvenile, without first obtain-
ing the consent required in Section 78-14-5 
of a parent, guardian, or person standing in 
loco parentis of the juvenile except in cases 
of an emergency; for purposes of this subsec-
tion, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in 
Section vo-oa-4, auu w..~-
 0 
physical condition requiring the administra-
tion of a controlled substance for immediate 
relief of pain or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this 
chapter knowingly and intentionally to pre-
scribe or administer dosages of a controlled 
substance in excess of medically recognized 
quantities necessary to treat the ailment, 
malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, adminis-
ter, or dispense any controlled substance to 
another person knowing that the other per-
son is using a false name, address, or other 
personal information for the purpose of se-
curing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds 
or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or 
II, or marijuana, if the amount is more than 
16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty 
of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in 
the form of an extracted resin from any part 
of the plant, and the amount is more than 
one ounce but less than 16 ounces, 
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries 
of property occupied by any correctional facility 
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or 
other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a 
penalty one degree greater than provided in Sub-
section (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of 
possession of any controlled substance by a per-
son previously convicted under Subsection (2)(b), 
that person shall be sentenced to a one degree 
greater penalty than provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled sub-
stances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), 
or (iii), including less than one ounce of mari-
juana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a 
second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the per-
son is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon 
a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tions (2)(aHii) through (2)la)(vii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distrib-
ute or dispense a controlled substance in vio-
lation of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, dis-
tribute, or dispense a controlled substance to 
another licensee or other authorized person 
not authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a 
symbol required by this chapter or by a rule 
issued under this chapter; 
nisn any recwu, nvi...vH , _ 
statement, invoice, or information required 
under this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for 
inspection as authorized by this chapter, 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (3)(a) shall be punished by a civil penalty of 
not more than $5,000. The proceedings are inde-
pendent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceed-
ings under this chapter or any other law of this 
state. If the violation is prosecuted by informa-
tion or indictment which alleges the violation 
was committed knowingly or intentionally, that 
person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly 
and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture 
or distribution of a controlled substance a 
license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for 
the purpose of obtaining a controlled sub-
stance, to assume the title of, or represent 
himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, 
apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, 
or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to 
procure or attempt to procure the adminis-
tration of, or to prescribe or dispense to any 
person known to be attempting to acquire or 
obtain possession of or procure the adminis-
tration of, any controlled substance by mis-
representation, fraud, forgery, deception, 
subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or 
the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescrip-
tion or written order for a controlled sub-
stance, or to utter the same, or to alter any 
prescription or written order issued or writ-
ten under the terms of this chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material 
information in any application, report, or 
other document required to be kept by this 
chapter, or to willfully make any false state-
ment in any prescription, order, report, or 
record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any 
punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing de-
signed to print, imprint, or reproduce the 
trademark, trade name, or other identifying 
mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any 
drug or container or labeling so as to render 
any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsec-
tion (4Ha) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this 
section, a person not authorized under this chap-
ter who commits any act declared to be unlawful 
under this section, Chapter 37a, Title 58, the 
Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Chapter 
37b, Title 58, the Imitation Controlled Sub-
stances Act, is upon conviction subject to the pen-
alties and classifications under Subsection <5)<b) 
if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or 
secondary school or on the grounds of any of 
those schools; 
(ii) in those portions of any building, park, 
stadium, or other structure or grounds which 
are, at the time of the act, being used for an 
activity sponsored by or through a school un-
der Subsection (5)(a)(i); 
(iii) within 1,000 feet of any structure, fa-
cility, or grounds included in Subsection 
(5Xa)(i) or (ii); or 
- * -^ —t»cr>n vnuTwer than 18 years 
§ 5 9 - 1 9 - 1 0 6 ( 2 ) , U.C.A. 
59-19-106. Civil penalty — Criminal penalty — 
Statute of limitations — Burden of 
proof. 
(1) Any dealer violating this chapter is subject to a 
penalty of 100% of the tax in addition to the tax im-
posed by Section 59-19-103. The penalty shall be col-
lected as part of the tax. 
(2) In addition to the tax penalty imposed, a dealer 
distributing or possessing marihuana or controlled 
substances without affixing the appropriate stamps, 
labels, or other indicia is guilty of a third degree fel-
ony. 
(3) An information, indictment, or complaint may 
be filed upon any criminal offense under this chapter 
within six years after the commission of the offense. 
This subsection supersedes any provisions to the con-
trary. 
(4) Any tax and penalties assessed by the commis-
sion are presumed to be valid and correct. The burden 
is on the taxpayer to show their incorrectness or inva-
lidity. 1969 
S77-23-3 , U.C.A. 
77-23-3. Conditions precedent to issuance. 
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation par-
ticularly describing the person or place to be searched 
and the person, property or evidence to be seized. 
77-23-5. Time for service — Officer may request 
assistance. 
(1) The magistrate must insert a direction in the 
warrant that it be served in the daytime, unless the 
affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable cause 
to believe a search is necessary in the night to seize 
the property prior to it being concealed, destroyed, 
damaged or altered, or for other good reason; in which 
case he may insert a direction that it be served any 
time of the day or night. An officer may request other 
persons to assist him in conducting the search. 
(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten 
days from the date of issuance. Any search warrant 
not executed within such time shall be void and shall 
be returned to the court or magistrate as not exe-
cuted. ,1960 
§ 7 7 - 3 5 - 2 6 , U.C.A. 
77-35-26. Rule 26 — Appeals [Repealed ef-
fective July 1, 1990]. 
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of 
the court from which the appeal is taken a notice of 
appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed from, 
and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his 
attorney of record. Proof of service of the copy shall be 
filed with the court. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether 
by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting 
the substantial rights of the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition 
for review, the appellate court decides that the 
appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defen-
dant by reason of a mental disease or defect in-
competent to proceed further in a pending prose-
cution. 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution 
from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution be-
cause of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of 
a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or 
any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial 
motion to suppress evidence when, upon a peti-
tion for review, the appellate court decides that 
the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest. 
U) (a) AH appeals in criminal cases shall be taken 
within 30 days after the entry of the judgment 
appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or 
arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after 
notice of the denial of the motion is given to the 
defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving notice 
shall be filed with the court. 
(b) An appeal may not be dismissed except for 
a material defect in taking it, or for failure to 
perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appel-
lant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms the 
judgment unless another appeal may be, and is, 
timely taken. 
(g) Cases appealed in which the defendant is un-
able to post bond shall be given a preferred and expe-
ditious setting in the appellate court. 
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs. If an ap-
pellant's brief is filed, the appeal shall be decided 
even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, fails 
to appear for oral argument. 
(7) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals 
govern criminal appeals to the appellate court, except 
as otherwise provided. 
(8) (a) In appeals to the Supreme Court of capital 
cases where the sentence of death has been im-
posed, appellant briefs shall be filed within 60 
days of the filing of the record on appeal. Respon-
dent briefs shall be filed within 60 days of receipt 
of the appellant brief. All issues to be raised on 
appeal shall be included by each party in its ap-
pellate brief. Appellant reply briefs shall be filed 
within 30 days of receipt of the respondent's 
brief. 
(b) One 30-day extension of the 60-day filing 
period may be granted to each party, but only 
upon application to the Supreme Court showing 
extraordinary circumstances warranting an ex-
tension. 
(c) The Supreme Court shall schedule the oral 
arguments of the case to be heard not more than 
ten days after the date of filing of the final brief. 
Following oral arguments, the case shall be 
placed first on the Supreme Court's calendar, for 
expeditious determination. 
(9) After an initial appeal has been resolved, a sub-
sequent appeal of a capital case where the sentence of 
death has been imposed may not be entertained by 
any court, nor may a stay of execution of the sentence 
be granted, when the appeal does not raise any new 
matter not previously resolved or when new matter 
could have been raised at the previous appeal. 
(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death 
has been imposed and the defendant has chosen not to 
pursue his appeal, the case shall be automatically 
reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after 
certification by the sentencing court of the entire 
record, unless the time is extended by the Supreme 
Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of 
death has priority over all other cases in setting for 
hearing and in disposition by the Supreme Court. 
(11) The rules of practice for the Court of Appeals 
and circuit courts made by the Judicial Council and 
approved by the Supreme Court relating to appeals 
from circuit courts govern criminal as well as civil 
aPpeals. 
(12) An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court 
or the Court of Appeals, as is appropriate, from all 
final orders and judgments rendered in a district 
court or juvenile court under this rule. 
(13) An appeal may be taken to the circuit court 
from a judgment rendered in the justice court under 
this rule, except: 
(a) the case shall be tried anew in the circuit 
court. The decision of the circuit court is final, 
except when the validity or constitutionality of a 
statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court; 
(b) within 20 days after receipt of the notice of 
appeal, the justice court shall transmit to the cir-
cuit court a certified copy of the docket, the origi-
nal pleadings, all notices, motions, and other pa-
pers filed in the case, and the notice and under-
taking on appeal; 
(c) stay of execution and relief pending appeal 
are under Rule 27, Utah Rules of Court [Crimi-
nal] Procedure; or 
(d) all further proceedings are in the circuit 
court, including any process required to enforce 
judgment. 1989 
Rule 3, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeal 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: How taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judg-
ments. As defined and provided by law, an appeal 
may be taken from the final orders and judgments of 
a district court, juvenile court, or circuit court to the 
Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the 
clerk of the particular court from which the appeal is 
taken within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of 
an appellant to take any step other than the timely 
filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity 
of the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as 
the Court of Appeals deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions 
short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney 
fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more 
parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or an 
order and their interests are such as to make joinder 
practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or 
join in an appeal of another party after filing separate 
timely notices of appeal. Such joint appeals may 
thereafter proceed and be treated as a single appeal 
with a single appellant. Individual appeals may be 
consolidated by order of the Court of Appeals on its 
own motion, on motion of a party, or by stipulation of 
the parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the 
appeal shall be known as the appellant and the ad-
verse party as the respondent. The title of the action 
or proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of 
the appeal* except where otherwise directed by the 
Court of Appeals. In original proceedings in the Court 
0f Appeals, the party making the original application 
shall be known as the plaintiff and any other party as 
the defendant. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of ap-
peal shall specify the party or parties taking the ap-
peal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part 
thereof, appealed from; shall name the court from 
which the appeal is taken; and shall designate that 
the appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking 
the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice of 
appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judg-
ment or order or, if the party is not represented by 
counsel, to the party at the last known address of the 
party. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. 
At the time of filing any separate or joint notice of 
appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal 
shall pay to the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal is taken such filing fees as are established by 
law and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the 
Court of Appeals. The clerk of the court from which 
the appeal is taken shall not accept a notice of appeal 
unless the filing and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the 
notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the 
clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken 
shall forthwith transmit one copy of the notice of ap-
peal, showing the date of its filing, together with the 
docketing fee, to the clerk of the Court of Appeals. 
Upon receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and 
the docketing fee, the clerk of the Court of Appeals 
shall thereupon enter the appeal upon the docket. An 
appeal shall be docketed under the title given to the 
action in the court from which the appeal is taken, 
with the appellant identified as such, but if such title 
does not contain the name of the appellant, such 
name shall be added to the title. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 14 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden <— 
Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. ia» 
Constitution of the United States. Amendment IV 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
^ No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent. 
v. 
JOHN J. MURPHY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 890429-CA 
Based upon the foregoing motion and good cause appear-
ing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant/Appellant nay 
have an additional ten (10) days within which to file his 
Docketing Statement. 
Said Docketing Statement will be filed on or before 
August 7, 1989. 
DATED this / j ^ / / day of _j^$5l989. 
1&UCL-
%£&*'of'SUAgr-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on 03, August 1989 I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by depositing the same with the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Loni F. Deland 
McRae & Deland 
Attorney for Appellant 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
R. Paul Van Dam 
A t t o r n e y General 
B U I L D I N G M A I L 
DATED this 03rd day of August, 1989. 
Kathleen Flynn 
Deputy Clerk 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent. 
v. 
JOHN J. MURPHY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 
TIME TO FILE DOCKETING 
STATEMENT 
Case No. 890429-CA 
Defendant/Appellant, John J. Murphy, through his 
counsel, Loni F. DeLand, requests that this Court grant a ten 
(10) day extension of time within which to file his Docketing 
Statement in this matter, for the reason that counsel for Defen-
dant/Appellant has been in trial and unable to prepare same. 
The Docketing Statement is presently due on July 28, 1989. 
DATED this ?.g day of July, 1989. 
F. De/LAND V 
>rney for Defendant/Appellant 
LOfTl 
Attorne
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^ day of July, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
A-3 
prepaid fully thereon, to the Utah Attorney General, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) STAY OF SENTENCE AND 
Plaintiff, ) CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE 
) CAUSE 
V. ) 
) Case No. 1220 
JOHN J. MURPHY, ) 
Defendant. ) 
The court, having heard the stipulations of counsel 
herein regarding Defendant's conditional plea for purposes of 
appeal and having heard the arguments of counsel regarding 
Defendant's issues on appeal and Defendant's Notice of Appeal 
having been timely filed and the parties Stipulation Re: Certifi-
cate of Probable Cause and Stay of Sentence Pending Appeal being 
read by the court; 
The court finds that the issues on appeal are meritori-
ous and for good cause shown, the sentence previously ordered by 
the court herein on June 5, 1989, should be stayed and the court 
does therefore: 
ORDER the issuance of a Certificate of Probable Cause 
and does stay Defendant's sentence herein during the pendency of 
Defendant' s appeal. 
DATED this day of July; 1989. 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of July, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attor-
ney's Office, P.O. Box 128, Coalville, Utah 84017. 
LGNI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JOHN J. MURPHY, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 1220 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Defendant, John J. Murphy, 
is appealing from the conviction entered by the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick, Judge of the above-entitled court, on June 5, 
1989, to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this 3 day of July, 1989. 
LUNI 'F. DfLAND 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 day of July, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Robert W. Adkins and Terry L. 
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Christiansen, Summit County Attorney's Office, P^ _0, Box 128, 
Coalville, Utah 84017. 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JOHN J . MURPHY, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
C r i m i n a l No. 1 2 2 0 
COMES NOW, John J . Murphy , the defendant in this case and 
hereby acknowledge and cer t i f ies the following: 
I have entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s). 
CRIME 










0 to 5 years 
$5,000.00 fine 
25% Surcharge 
p*y A^ **' Ufi? Urnl^-
E. 
I have received a copy of the information against me, I have read i t , and I 
understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading 
A-7 
guilty. 
wi thout p r e j u d i c e 
In return for my plea of guil ty, the State agrees to dismiss/the following: 
Counts I I , I I I and IV of Cr imina l No. 1220 . 
• 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: 
That on or about t h e 19th day of September, 198fr, i n Summit 
County, State 
knowingly and 
to wit: Mari] 





JOHN J. MURPHY, 




My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
l iable , that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows: 
On September 19, 1989, i n Summit County, Utah, I d id knowingly 
and i n t e n t i o n a l l y d i s t r i b u t e a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e , t o w i t : 
Mar i juana . 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and 
understanding of the following facts : 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that 
i f I cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court a t no cost 
to me. 
2. I jggtYB/havo not waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right 
to counsel, I have done so knowingly, intel l igently and voluntarily because of 
the following reasons 
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3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and 
understand the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other 
proceedings and the consequences of my plea of guil ty. 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney i s Loni F . 
DeLand
 9 an (j I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement, my 
rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a t r i a l by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a t r i a l , I have the right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my 
attorney. I also know that I have the right to have my witnesses subpoenaed a t 
state expense to testify in court upon my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but i f I choose 
not to do so I can not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself 
and no adverse inferences will be drawn against me i f I do not test ify. 
8. I know that i f I wish to contest the charge against me, I need only 
plead "not guilty" and the natter will be set for t r i a l , a t which time the 
State of Utah will have the burden of proving each element of the charge beyond 
a reasonable doubt. If the t r i a l i s before a jury the verdict must be 
unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that i f I were tried and 
convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal my 
conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, to the 
Supreme Court of Utah and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such 
appeal, those costs would be paid by the State. 
10. I know that the maximum possible sentence may be imposed upon my plea 
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of guilty, and that sentence may be for a prison term, fine, or both. I know 
that in addition to any fine, a 25/5 surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 
63-63-9, will be imposed. I also know that I nay be ordered by the court to 
make restitution to any victim or victims of my crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment nay be for consecutive periods, or the fine 
for additional amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know 
that if I am on probation, parole or awaiting sentencing on another offense of 
which I have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea in the 
present action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my statutory 
and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know 
that by entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have 
committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my 
plea(s) is/are entered. 
13. My plea(s) of guilty is/is not the result of a plea bargain between 
myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of 
this plea bargain, if any, are as follows: Defendant is entering a 
condi t ional plea of g u i l t y to Count I , reserving the r i g h t to 
appeal the Cour t ' s Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Should the Court of Appeals reverse the ru l ing on Defendant 's 
Suppression motion, the S ta te of Utah reserve the r i g h t to r e - f i l e 
Counts I I , I I I & I I I . 
14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of 
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing made or sought by either defense counsel of the prosecuting attorney 
are not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinons they nay express to 
me as to what they believe the court may do are also not binding on the court. 
- 4 -
15. No threats, coercion, or unlawful Influence of any kind have been made 
to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except, those contained herein, 
have been made to me. 
16. I have read this statement or I have had i t read to me by my attorney, 
and I understand i t s provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this affidavit . I do not wish to make any changes 
because a l l of the statements are correct. 
17. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
18. I am ^ 4* years of age; I have attended school through fete-* CstJv&t' 
gi=ade and I can read and understand the English language. I was not under the 
influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter 
the plea(s) was made. I am not presently under the influence of any drugs, 
medication or intoxicants. 
19. I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning mind, mentally capable 
of understanding tte proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of 
any mental disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, 
intel l igently and voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this _ j / _ day of May , 1989. 
Jonn J . Murphy 
Defendant 
- 5 -
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for John J . Murphy 
the defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I 
have read i t to him/her and I have discussed i t with him/her and believe that 
he/she fully understands the meaning of i t s contents and i s mentally and 
physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief after an 
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual 
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, 
along with the other reprsentations and declarations made by the defendant in 
the foregoing statement, are accurate and 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
John J . Murphy , defendant. I have reviewed this statement of 
the defendant and find that the declarations, including the elements of the 
offense of the charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendants criminal 
conduct which constitutes the offense are true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered 
defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in this statement or as 
supplemented on record before the court. There i s reasonable cause to believe 
that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) 
for which the plea(s) is /are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve 
the public in teres t . 
O R D E R 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and 
certif ication, the court finds the defendant's plea of guilty i s freely and 
voluntarily made and i t i s so ordered that the defendant's plea of guilty to 
the charge(s) set forth in th is statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this day of May , 1969. 
J . DENNIS FREDERICK 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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Robert W. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaint i ff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : ORDER GRANTING IN PART 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
vs : 
JOHN T. MURPHY, : Criminal No. 1220 
Defendant. : 
On March 6, 1989, defendant filed his Motion in Limine. Plaint iff 
responded to the motion and defendant f i led a reply to p la in t i f f ' s response. 
Plaint i f f and defendant through their respective counsel stipulated that the 
motion could be decided without oral argument, and the clerk submitted the 
matter to the Court for decision. The Court having reviewed the pleadings on 
f i l e herein, and being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion in Limine i s granted only to the 
extent that evidence presented by pla int i f f a t t r i a l will be limited to that 
evidence which i s necessary to supplement or prove the allegations contained in 
the various counts of the Information. 
DATED this day of April, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
A-8 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
postage prepaid, this / day of April, 1989, to Loni F. DeLand, attorney 
for defendant at 132 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Robert W. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs 
JOHN T. MURPHY, 
Plaintiff , 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Criminal No. 1220 
On March 6, 1989, defendant filed his Objection to P la in t i f f ' s Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. Pla int i f f responded to defendant's objection, and defendant filed a 
reply to p l a in t i f f ' s response. Plaintiff and defendant through their 
respective counsel stipulated that the motion could be decided without oral 
argument, and the clerk submitted the matter to the Court for decision. The 
Court having reviewed the pleadings on f i le herein, and being fully advised in 
the premises, 
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Objection to P la in t i f f ' s Proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Defendant's Motion to Suppress be, and 
the same hereby i s , denied. 
DATED this day of April, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
postage prepaid, this / day of April, 1989, to Loni F. DeLand, attorney 
for defendant a t 132 South 6CO East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Robert V. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Pla in t i f f , : ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR RE-HEARING 
vs : 
JOHN T. MURPHY, : Criminal No. 1220 
Defendant. : 
On February 13, 1989, defendant f i l ed h is Motion for Rehearing. P l a i n t i f f 
responded to Defendant's Motion for Rehearing, and defendant f i l ed a 
Supplemental Response. P l a in t i f f and defendant through thei r respective 
counsel s t ipula ted tha t the motion could be decided without oral argument, and 
the clerk submitted the matter to the Court for decision. The Court having 
reviewed the pleadings on f i l e herein, and being ful ly advised in the premises, 
IT IS ORDERED tha t Defendant's Motion for Re-hearing be, and the same 
hereby i s , denied. 
DATED th i s day of April , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
postage prepaid, this / day of April, 1989, to Loni F. DeLand, attorney 
for defendant a t 132 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT - STATE OF UTAH 
FILE NO. 1220 
VrLE: (• PARTIES PRESENT) 
STATE OF UTAH 
V 
JOHN J. MURPHY 
COUNSEL: uCOUNSEL PRESENT) 
ROBERT W. ADKINS 
COALVILLE, UT 8401/ 
LONI F. DELAND 
132 b bUU hi 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102 
JOYF, T). OVART) 
CLERK HON. J . DENNIS FREDERICK 
JUDGE 
REPORTER DATE APRIL 3 , 1989 
BAILIFF 
COURT'S DECISION: 
After receiving letter of March 24, 1989, from Summit County Attorney indicating that both 
Counsel wish to submit Defendant's pending motions for decision without oral argument and 
request to submit the matter and Court's review of same, Court rules as follows: 
1. Defendant's OBJECTIONS'S TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS are denied, 
2. Defendant's REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION is denied. 
Defendant's MOTION IN LIMINE IS GRANTED TO THE EXTENT THAT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WILL BE 
LIMITED TO THAT NECESSARY TO SUPPLEMENT ALLEGATIONS OF INFORMATION. 
Mr. Adkins is to prepare appropriate order. 
Copies mailed to counsel as shown above, 4-4-89. JO 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN T. MURPHY, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY RE: 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
Case No. 1220 
EVIDENCE AT JAIL 
Since Plaintiff concedes that counsel was unaware of 
the evidence seized at the jail until after February 6, 1989, 
Plaintiff must also concede that Defendant was denied the oppor-
tunity to include defenses in his pre-trial motion to suppress. 
It is ludicrous to expect Defendant to raise defenses 
to a non-existent charge. Further, to do so would be irrelevant 
The bottom line is that the jail matter is a distinct and subse-
quent episode which is not charged in the Information. 




Defendant concedes that Plaintiff need only present 
evidence to satisfy a probable cause standard as to each count at 
pre-lim. However, it cannot omit the presentation of evidence on 
one count but not another; further, it cannot omit evidence which 
is the very corpus of the offense. 
DATED this >^~> day of March, 19,89. 
LONI F." DeLAND 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^ o day of March, 1989, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attor-
ney, Summit County Courthouse, P.O. Box 128, Coalville, Utah 
84017. 
Ut 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO 
) PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE 
v. ) RE: OBJECTIONS 
JOHN T. MURPHY, ) Case No. 1220 
Defendant. ) 
Defendant hereafter supplements his Objections to 
Plaintiff's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
direct reply to Plaintiff's Response under date of March 14, 
1989: 
FINDINGS 
3. Findings cannot be based on what is "obvious" but 
rather on the evidence, i.e., Mr. Ford testified he was not 
suspicious of Defendant's package; Mrs. (Officer) Ford said that 
Mr. Ford told her that he was. 
Further, Defendant's package was opened first but left 
alone for nearly three hours before the second package was 
opened. All testimony so states. 
The transcripts of preliminary hearing testimony are 
the best source of the undisputed facts. 
7. Again, the transcript testimony of Mr. Ford was 
that the two prior successful searches were in August and on 
September 9, 1988. Why not say so instead of referring to the 18 
month time period of which 17 are irrelevant? Or why not include 
both facts? 
Defendant agrees that the second sentence of the second 
paragraph in proposed finding number 7 is the more appropriate 
statement of fact. 
Why use the conclusory language, "encouraged or direct-
ed"? Just recite their actual testimony. Or, add that neither 
did they dissuade or discourage future searches. 
8. See Defendant's Objections, same number. 
9. The record clearly shows Mr. Ford's active under-
cover role in the first two seizures during attempts to entice 
the searchers to come in on a pretext to facilitate their arrest. 
10. See Defendant's Objections, same number. 
11. Any reference to price lists and drugs is 
conclusory. Since no such exhibits were offered nor their actual 
annotations specified, no finding can be articulated as to the 
contents thereof. 
15. "Plain view" is a legal conclusion. Further, only 
contraband is subject to seizure so only paraphernalia is 
arguable seizable since anything beyond the items specified in 
the warrant exceeds the scope thereof. 
CONCLUSIONS 
2. Argument is not evidence. No conclusions can be 
made without underlying factual bases. 
DATED this & > day of March, 1989> 
LONI F. D.eLAND 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Z 3 day of March, 1989, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attor-
ney, Summit County Courthouse, P.O. Box 128, Coalville, Utah 
84017. 
-t-=T 
Robert W. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : PLAINTIFF1S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
vs : 
JOHN T. MURPHY, : Criminal No. 1220 
Defendant. : 
P l a i n t i f f responds to Defendant's Motion in Limine as follows: 
EVIDENCE AT JAIL 
On February 13, 1989, counsel for the p l a i n t i f f informed counsel for the 
defendant tha t there was an addit ional witness tha t the State intended to ca l l 
a t the t r i a l of Mr. Murphy. A copy of counsel !s l e t t e r of February 13, 1989, 
i s attached hereto. That l e t t e r i den t i f i e s the addi t ional witness as Summit 
County J a i l e r , Gale Pace. Defense counsel was informed tha t when the defendant 
was booked, he was searched by Mr. Pace and Mr. Pace found marijuana and drug 
paraphernalia on Mr. Murphy's person. 
Defendant advances several arguments why p l a i n t i f f should be prohibited 
from presenting tha t evidence tha t was seized from the defendant's person, 
which p l a in t i f f wi l l address in the order presented. 
A-14 
1. " Defendant has received no reports or pr ior information concerning such 
evidence, nor are facts thereof, or witnesses thereto contained in the Criminal 
Information ." P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel informed defendant 's counsel that Mr. Pace 
had located marijuana and drug paraphernalia on Mr. Murphy's person when he was 
being booked into the Summit County J a i l . That infor nation was received by 
p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel a few days pr ior to February 13, 1989. Prior to tha t , 
p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel had been unaware that drugs or drug paraphernalia had been 
recovered d i r ec t ly from the defendant's person. The purpose of the l e t t e r of 
February 13, 1989, was to bring tha t to defense counsel 's a t t en t ion . Mr. Pace 
did not prepare a report a t the time of the search, but has been requested by 
p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel to do so. When tha t report i s received, i t wil l be 
furnished to defense counsel. 
2 . " Nor was the same [the seizure of narijuana and drug paraphernalia from 
the defendant 's person] brought up a t the Preliminary Hearing ." The seizure 
of marijuana and drug paraphernalia was not brought up a t the preliminary 
hearing because i t was not necessary to do so in order to bind the defendant 
over on the charges. I t i s cer ta in ly not unusual for the State not to put on 
a l l of i t s evidence a t the preliminary hearing, since the preliminary hearing 
i s for the purposes of probable cause only. None of defendant's pr ior motions 
or the other hearing dea l t with the search a t the j a i l , and therefore, i t was 
not necessary to a resolut ion of the pr ior motions or hearings. 
3 . " The Information [provided by p l a i n t i f f ] i s void of specif ic fac ts and 
circumstances suff ic ient to enable defendant to defend e i ther a t t r i a l or 
before ." As previously pointed out, the p l a i n t i f f has provided defendant with 
a l l of the information tha t i s presently in the County Attorney's possession. 
However, the defendant cer ta in ly has not been prejudiced, since the defendant 
has known of t h i s information since September 20, 1988. The defendant was 
present when he was booked, and knows tha t he was searched and tha t the items 
were seized by the j a i l e r . 
EVIDENCE IN THE VEHICLE 
Defendant wants to do in h is Motion in Limine exactly the same thing 
that he attempted to do in h is Motion to Suppress, i . e . to prevent the Sta te 
from introducing the evidence tha t was found in the vehicle defendant was 
driving. Defendant should not be permitted to r e l i t i g a t e tha t i ssue . 
P l a i n t i f f wi l l address the claims raised by the defendant in the order 
presented: 
1. I! Evidence seized from the vehicle driven by defendant when a r res ted 
was never presented nor referred to a t Preliminary Hearing . " Apparently 
defendant i s arguing tha t i f a piece of evidence i s not presented a t the 
preliminary hearing, that the State i s prohibited from using i t a t T r i a l . That 
i s a novel argument: i f the Court were to adopt that pos i t ion , i t would 
to t a l ly change the purpose and complexion of preliminary hearings. I f tha t 
were the law, the State would have to offer every piece of evidence i t intended 
to use a t t r i a l . That would r e s u l t in considerably lengthening preliminary 
hearings without serving any legi t imate purpose. 
2. " P l a i n t i f f ' s Affidavit Tfrom Officer Stevens] presents new 
questions of law and fac ts concerning the vehicle search in conf l i c t with 
pr ior repor ts provided defendant through discovery ." The Stevens Affidavit , 
as pointed out in P l a i n t i f f ' s Supplemental Response f i led herewith, c lea r ly 
es tabl i shes tha t consent to the search of the vehicle was freely given 
by the defendant and his wife. Defendant has submitted nothing in 
e i ther the police reports or any counter-aff idavi ts tha t would contradic t 
the voluntariness of the search. After reviewing Lt . Stevens' Affidavit and 
the police reports in t h i s matter, p l a i n t i f f ' s counsel cannot see where the two 
confl ic t . However, i f there i s any conf l ic t , tha t i s a na t te r tha t can be 
pointed out to the t r i e r of fact a t t r i a l . That i s not a basis for preventing 
p la in t i f f from using the marijuana that was contained in the vehicle. 
DATED this /T day of March, 1989. 
Summit County Attorney 
Attorney for P la in t i f f 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby cer t i fy tha t I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
P l a i n t i f f ' s Response to Defendant's Motion in Limine, postage prepaid, th i s 
/ / day of March, to Loni F. DeLand, a t torney for defendant, a t 132 South 
600 East, Sal t Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Robert W. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 356-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR 
vs : RECONSIDERATION 
JOHN T. MURPHY, : Criminal No. 1220 
Defendant. : 
P l a i n t i f f fee l s compelled to again respond to defendant's Request for 
Reconsideration, because of what p l a i n t i f f views as a misinterpretat ion of the 
Affidavit of L t . Stevens. Tte Stevens Affidavit s e t s forth the following 
fac t s : 
1. Following the defendant's a r r e s t , Mrs. Murphy was asked for permission 
to search the vehic le . 
2 . Mrs. Murphy s tated that she would have to ask her husband. 
3 . Defendant then said that he might as well show the off icers what they 
were looking for , because i f he did not , they would obtain a search warrant for 
the vehicle . 
4. The defendant then went to the vehicle and retr ieved a green leafy 
substance. Mrs. Murphy then signed the Consent to Search form and addi t ional 
marijuana was recovered from the vehicle . 
From the foregoing fac t s , i t appears to p l a i n t i f f tFBt consent was c lear ly 
voluntary. The police off icers simply asked for permission -to search the 
vehicle. Defendant voluntar i ly removed marijuana from the vehicle. 
Thereafter, Mrs. Murphy signed the Consent to Search form without further 
requests by the police of f icers . Once the defendant removed the marijuana from 
the vehicle, the police off icers c lear ly had probable cause to search the 
vehicle, i r respect ive of whether Mrs. Murphy signed the consent to search 
form. 
Defendant's claim that consent to search the vehicle was not freely given 
i s not supported by the record. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration should 
be summarily denied. 
DATED this / / day of March, 1989. 
Summit County Attorney 
Attorney for P la in t i f f 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby cer t i fy that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Supplemental Objection to Defendant's Request for Reconsideration, , postage 
prepaid, th i s / / day of Sebruary, £989, to Loni F. DeLand, at torney for 
defendant, a t 132 South 600 East, Sa l t Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Robert V. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P . 0 . Box 123 
Coalvi l le , Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for P la in t i f f 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P la in t i f f , 
vs 
JOHN T. MURPHY, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Criminal No. 1220 
Defendant has objected to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and p l a i n t i f f wi l l respond to those objections in the order presented by 
defendant: 
FINDINGS 
3 . Obviously Mr. Ford was suspicious of defendant 's package, or i t would 
not have been opened. The package r a t t l e d , and was similar to a second package 
tha t was brought into The Packaging Store short ly a f t e r defendant l e f t his 
package with Mr. Ford. That second package had been opened by Mr. Ford and 
found to contain marijuana. Mr. Ford then opened the defendant 's package_and_ 
i t a l so contained marijuana. The fac t that the package r a t t l e d and defendant's 
explanation for tha t was tha t i t contained dog bones, ce r ta in ly lead Mr. Ford 
to be suspicious of the package. 
P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel does not r eca l l the defendant having ins t ructed Mr. 
Ford to not open the package. However, i f he did ins t ruc t Mr. Ford to not 
open the package, tha t would cer ta in ly further arouse the suspicions of Mr. 
Ford re la t ive to the package. 
7 . The testimony was tha t as of September, 1988, that Mr. Ford ted 
operated The Packaging Store for approximately eighteen months, and that he had 
discovered packages on two occasions prior to September 19, 1988, that 
ontained controlled substances. The finding i s nei ther misleading nor 
inaccurate. 
On a l l occasions, the evidence was turned over to the Park City Police 
Department. I t was not turned over to Mrs. Ford in her capacity as the wife of 
Mr. Ford, but as a peace off icer for the Park City Police Department. 
Defendant objects to the l a s t sentence in paragraph 7 tha t provides: ,fMr. 
Ford was not encouraged or directed by the Park City Police Department 
regarding any future suspicious packages." That i s cer ta in ly the testimony of 
both Lee Ford and Detective Mary Ford. 
8. P la in t i f f bel ieves tha t Finding No. 8 in i t s en t i r e ty i s appropriate. 
9. P la in t i f f bel ieves tha t Finding No. 9 accurately se t s out Lee Ford !s 
involvement. Lee Ford was not "an act ive undercover pa r t i c ipan t as claimed by 
defendant. 
10. P la in t i f f bel ieves tha t Finding No. 10 i s appropriate in i t s en t i r e ty . 
14. The evidence as argued a t the hearing on February 6, 1989, dea l t with 
price l i s t s for control led substances. Both counsel addressed tha t i ssue , and 
cer ta in ly price l i s t s would be a record that " ref lec ts drug t raf f icking" . 
However, p l a in t i f f i s wi l l ing to subs t i tu te the phrase "price l i s t for drugs" 
in place of "records tha t r e f l e c t drug t ra f f ick ing ." 
15. The drug paraphernalia, cash, and records came into the plain view of 
the off icers when they were executing the search warrant for the Federal 
Express Air Bi l l and controlled substances. P l a i n t i f f believes Finding No. 
15 i s appropriate in i t s en t i r e ty . 
16. The search of defendant's vehicle did not begin pr ior to his a r r e s t as 
claimed by the defendant. The defendant was a r res ted and then his wife was 
asked for permission to search the vehicle. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
2. The Court could cer ta in ly conclude tha t a pr ice l i s t for drugs i s a 
wri t ing or record "ref lec t ing drug t ra f f ick ing" . The issue of the price l i s t 
being found in the defendant's mobile home was argued by both counsel, and i t 
i s appropriate to refer to the same as a record r e f l ec t ing drug t raf f icking. 
However, p l a i n t i f f i s wi l l ing to subs t i tu te the phrase "price l i s t for drugs" 
in place of "record ref lec t ing drug t r a f f i ck ing , " i f defendant finds tha t 
phrase more to h is l ik ing. 
Defendant's objection to P l a i n t i f f ' s Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law should be denied. 
DATED th i s // day of March, 1989. 
ikins 
Summit County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of P la in t i f f ' s 
Response to Defendant's Objection to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
postage prepaid, this // day of March, 1989, to Loni F. DeLand, attorney 
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J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
3-7-89 
JUDGE 
COURT ADVISES COUNSEL THAT HE WILL ACCEPT A GUILTY PLEA RESERVING ISSUE OF APPEAL ON DENIAL 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
COUNSEL CALLED AND COPIES SENT TO COUNSEL ON 3-7-89. 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN T. MURPHY, 
Defendant. 
I MOTION IN LIMINE 
i Case No. 1220 
Defendant, through counsel, Loni F. DeLand, moves this 
Court to order Plaintiff to refrain from presenting certain 
evidence at trial as set forth below7: 
1. Evidence at Jail 
Plaintiff only recently, and by letter, advised Defen-
dant of the intent to offer evidence consisting of controlled 
substances and/or paraphernalia seized from Defendant's person at 
the time of his booking into jail. 
a. Defendant has received no reports or prior informa-
tion concerning such evidence, nor are facts thereof or witnesses 
thereto contained in the Criminal Information; nor was the same 
brought up in preliminary hearing or prior to motions and 
pre-trial hearings. 
b. The information recently provided is void of 
specific facts and circumstances sufficient to enable Defendant 
to defend either at trial or before. 
2. Evidence in Vehicle 
a. Evidence seized from the vehicle driven by Defen-
dant when arrested was never presented nor referred to at prelim-
inary hearing. 
b. Plaintiff's affidavit (Officer Stevens recently 
submitted) presents new questions of law and facts concerning the 
vehicle search in conflict with prior reports provided Defendant 
through discovery. 
For the above reasons, the court should order that no 
testimony or evidence be offered at trial on said seizures, none 
of which affect the corpus element of any Count charged. 
/ 
/ 
DATED this (V day of March, 1989. 
LONI F. DeLAND :--
Attorney/for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
-y< 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ,' -> day of March, 1989, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Robert W. Adkins, Summit County 
> 
Attorney, Summit County Courthouse, P.O. Box 128,/Coalville, Utah 
84017. 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN T. MURPHY, 
Defendant. 
1 OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
I PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
1 MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
1 Case No. 1220 
Defendant, through counsel, Loni F. DeLand, objects to 
proposed Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Defen-
dant's Motion to Suppress submitted by Plaintiff, received by 
Defendant by mail on March 6, 1989, as follov/s: 
FINDINGS: 
3. Evidence was conflicting as to whether Kr. Ford was 
or was not "suspicious"; the court made no finding as to either. 
Omits clear instructions to Kr. Ford from Defendant to "not" 
open. 
7. Evidence was that the two previous cases were 
within a month of the instant one; "eighteen months" is mislead-
ing . 
Omits that all four times the evidence was turned over 
to Mrs. Ford. 
Last sentence is both conclusory and inferential; no 
such finding made. 
8. That Mr. Ford was "not an agent" is a conclusion of 
law. 
9. Inaccurate. Evidence shows that Mr. Ford was an 
active "undercover" participant on two occasions in August and 
September, 1988, following two other seizures. 
10. Conclusion of law regarding agency. 
14. No evidence before court that records "reflect(ed) 
drug trafficking." 
15. Same as number 14, above; plus, said items were not 
in plain view. 
16. The said search began prior to the arrest of 
Defendant; the Consent to Search form was not before the court 
but was only mentioned by counsel in memoranda and in argument 
until submitted as an exhibit in post-hearing Motion for 
Re-Hearing. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
2. "(R)eflecting drug trafficking" cannot be properly 
concluded from facts which did not evidence same. 
Defendant requests the court to delete, modify and/or 
enlarge the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
per Defendant's objections. 
DATED th is b day of March, 1989.
 s \ 
LONI F. DeL'AND 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of March, 1989, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attor-
ney, Summit County Courthouse, P.O. Box 128, Coalville, Utah 
84017. / 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ] 
V. 
JOHN T. MURPHY, ] 
Defendant. 
1 SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO 
1 PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION 
1 FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. 1220 
Defendant, through counsel, Loni F. DeLand, submits his 
response to Plaintiff's Objection to Rehearing on his Motion to 
Suppress and supplements his request for rehearing based upon the 
new evidence Plaintiff provides in his objections, 
1. In the affidavit of Lt. Louis A. Stevens, he says 
that Defendant's wife, owner of the vehicle searched, declined to 
initially give her consent to search said vehicle when asked to 
sign a form therefore. 
2. Paragraph three therein, however, says she relented 
and signed only after her husband, (in the presence of several 
police officers), told her she "might as well" because, if not, 
the police would obtain a search warrant and search, anyway. 
3. The affidavit avers that thereafter, both Defendant 
and his wife acquiesced to the search and she signed the form. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant's prior memoranda clearly point out that a 
consent search raises substantial concern and that it is the 
Plaintiff's burden to prove consent was voluntary and free of 
coercion. When the suggestion is made by the police that they 
will go get a search warrant if consent is not given, the "con-
sent" is not voluntary. (Citations omitted, see pre-hearing 
Memoranda.) 
Where, as in this case, the police allow the Defen-
dant's belief that a warrant will be obtained, anyway, to go 
uncorrected, the same principle applies. The duty to protect 
constitutional rights is an affirmative one. Particularly where 
there is hesitation to allow it and an express erroneous belief 
regarding right to refuse. 
The court would surely suppress statements made without 
a Miranda warning if the police asked the Defendant to submit to 
questions and he did so under the express belief that the court 
would later order him to do so anyway. 
The court, in the interest of justice, must reconsider 
this issue and, in fact, can suppress the evidence seized from 
the vehicle on the undisputed testimony of Plaintiff's witness, 
Lt. Stevens. 
DATED this •/. day of March , 1989. / 
LONI FA DtfLAWIT' 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the L day of March, 1989, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attor-
ney, Summit County Courthouse, P.O. Box 128, Coalville, Utah 
84017. 
Robert V. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0 . Box 128 
Coalvi l le , Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs 
JOHN T. MURPHY, 
Pla in t i f f , 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Criminal No. 1220 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came on regular ly for hearing on the 6th day 
of February, 1989, before the Honorable J . Dennis Frederick, D i s t r i c t Judge; 
the Sta te was represented by Summit County Attorney, Robert W. Adkins, and the 
defendant was present and represented by h i s a t to rney , Loni F. DeLand. The 
Court having l is tened to the evidence presented and the arguments of counsel, 
and having heretofore made i t s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
good cause appearing therefore, i t i s 
ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Suppress be, and the same hereby i s , 
denied. 
DATED th i s day of , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 




I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress, postage prepaid, this SJ<^dx" day 
of jkj$rrvJfK , 1989, to Loni F. DeLand, attorney for defendant, a t 132 South 
600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Robert W. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0. Box 128 
Coalvi l le , Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for P la in t i f f 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW REGARDING; DEFENDANT'S 
vs : MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
JOHN T. MURPHY, : Criminal No. 1220 
Defendant. : 
Defendant's Motion to suppress came on regularly for hearing before the 
Court on February 6, 1989, a t the hour of 1:30 p.m.; the State was represented 
by Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attorney, and the defendant was present and 
represented by Ms a t torney, Loni F. DeLand. The Court having l is tened to the 
evidence presented, the Memorandums of the p a r t i e s , and the arguments of 
counsel, and being ful ly advised in the premises, now rakes i t s 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 19, 1988, defendant, John T. Murphy, entered The 
Packaging Store in Park Ci ty , Utah, which i s owned by Lee Ford, and requested 
that Mr. Ford ship a package by Federal Express. 
2. The defendant paid for the shipment, and received a Federal Express Air 
Bil l /Receipt for the package. 
3 . Defendant then l e f t The Packaging Store and l a t e r Lee Ford opened the 
package, berause(i*e was s u s p i c i o u s \ s to i t s contents . Lee Ford had noticed 
that the package r a t t l ed wten i t was brought in by the defendant, and the 
defendant's explanation was that i t contained "dog bones". 
4. Upon opening the package, Lee Ford discovered tha t i t contained a green 
leafy substance, which he believed to be marijuana. 
5. Lee Ford contacted the Park City Police Department, and talked to his 
wife, Mary Ford, who i s a Detective. 
6. Mary Ford cane to The Packaging Store, and Lee Ford turned the package 
over to Detective Ford, and told her what ted occurred. 
7. Lee Ford had discovered controlled substances in two previous 
shipments that were shipped from The Packaging Store during the approximately 
eighteen month^^chat Mr. Ford has operated tha t business. On those occasions, 
Mr. Ford turned the controlled substance over to the Park City Police 
Department. ^ Mr. Ford was not encouraged or directed by the Park C i tyPb l i ce 
4)epartment regarding any jfiiture suspicious jpackanes. 
8. Lee Ford received no money from any law enforcement agency for opening 
the package shipped by the defendant, and was not an agent of any law 
enforcement agency. 
9. Other than being married to Detective Ford, Lee Ford had no other 
involvement with the Park City Police Department except as se t forth above. 
10. Mr. Ford, when he opened the defendant's package, dyso_as_jL-£I^^ te 
individual and not as an agent of the government. 
11. Detective Ford removed the package to the Park City Police Department, 
v/here she and Detective P i r rag l io attempted to locate the whereabouts of the 
defendant. 
12. On the rece ip t , a copy of which had been turned over to Detective Ford 
by Lee Ford, the defendant had placed his telephone number. Detectives 
P i r r ag l io and Ford checked the telephone number and discovered tha t i t was 
l i s t ed to the defendant 's home in Hoytsvi l le , Utah, and ver i f ied tha t the 
defendant in fac t resided there . 
13. On September 20, 1988, a search warrant was obtained from the Third 
D i s t r i c t Court to search the defendant's home in Hoytsvil le for the Federal 
Express Air Bi l l /Receipt and controlled substances. 
14. The search warrant was executed on the premises on September 20, 1988, 
and the police recovered the Federal Express Air Bi l l /Receipt and marijuana, 
/ 
cash, drug paraphernalia, and records / ref lec t ing drug t raf f icking. 
15. The drug paraphernalia, cash, and records, re f lec t ing drug t raff icking 
were in pla in view when the search warrant was executed. 
16. Shortly a f t e r the search warrant was executed, the defendant and his 
wife were stopped on the highway near the i r home, and the defendant was 
a r res ted . After the defendant^s^arrest, a search was conducted of the vehicle 
tha t the defendant was dr iving, and marijuana was recovered therefrom. The 
defendant 's wife signed a Consent to Search form_Jbr_tt^jz^hicle. The 
defendant claims consent was not freely obtained, but the defendant fa i led 
to submit any evidence on tha t i ssue. 
The court having rade the foregoing Findings of Fact, now makes the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's Motion to Suppress with regard to the contents of the 
package mailed a t The Packaging Store should be denied. 
2. Defendant's Motion to Suppress with regard to the Federal Express Air 
Bi l l /Receipt , marijuana, money, drug paraphernalia, and records r e f l ec t ing drug 
trafficking ac t iv i t ies , a l l of which were located a t the defendant's residence, 
should be denied. 
3. Defendant's Motion to Suppres the maariuana recovered from the search 
of the vehicle driven by the defendant should be denied, 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
J . Dennis Frederick 
District Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, this ^"T^ day of 
February, t989, to Loni F. DeLand, attorney for defendant, a t 132 South 600 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Robert W. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P . 0 . Box 128 
Coalvi l le , Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
P la in t i f f , : ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT I I I 
vs : OF THE INFORMATION 
JOHN J . MURPHY, : Criminal No. 1220 
Defendant. : 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count I I I of the Information came on 
regularly for hearing on the 6th day of February, 1989, before the Honorable 
J . Dennis Frederick, D i s t r i c t Judge; the S ta te of Utah was represented by 
Summit County Attorney, Robert W. Adkins, and the defendant was present and 
represented by h is atorney, Loni F. DeLand. 
The Court having l is tened to the evidence presented and the arguments of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, i t i s hereby 
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count I I I of the Information be, 
and the same hereby i s , denied. 
DATED th i s day of , 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count I I I of the Information, 
postage prepaid, this ^"f^ day of ^ . t A r o A ^ , 1989, to Loni F. DeLand, 
attorney for plaintiff, a t 132 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
\ ^/jQl<«Jbt&4> 
Robert W. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaint i f f , : OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR RE-HEARING 
vs : 
JOHN T. MURPHY, : Criminal No. 1220 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the p la in t i f f , by and through i t s at torney, Robert W. Adkins, 
Summit County Attorney, and hereby objects to defendant's Motion for Re-Hearing 
for the following reasons: 
1. The court has already ruled on the motion, and defendant apparently was 
aware of the a l lega t ions contained in paragraph No. 1 of his motion a t the time 
t h i s matter was heard on February 6, 1989, but chose not to ra i se the issue a t 
that time. Defendant should not be permitted to pro t rac t t h i s matter 
indef in i te ly . The defendant had h is opportunity to present any evidence on 
February 6, 1989, and by not doing so should not be allowed to ra ise i t now. 
Additionally, defendant has fa i led to a t t ach any a f f idav i t s in support of h i s 
a l lega t ions contained in paragraph No. 1 of his motion. Attached hereto i s an 
a f f idavi t from Detective Pat P i r r ag l io of the Park City Police Departnent 
denying any such ac t s occurred to the knowledge of the Park City Pol ice . 
2 . Defendant had the opportunity to put on any evidence he chose regarding 
consent, or lack thereof, regarding the search of the vehicle a t the hearing 
on February 6, 1989. By f a i l i ng to put on such evidence, defendant did not 
meet h i s burden and the court appropriately denied h i s motion to suppress. 
{However, see the attached Affidavit of Lt . Louis A. Steven of the Summit 
County Sher i f f ' s Department which de t a i l s the search of the vehicle following 
defendant 's a r r e s t . ) 
3 . A request for rehearing i s not appropriate and the motion should be 
summarily denied. 
DATED th i s s3$_ day of February, 1989. 
Summit County Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby cer t i fy that I railed a true and correc t copy of the foregoing 
Objection to Defendant's Motion for Re-Hearing, postage prepaid, th is
 0 ) % r t ^ 
day of February, 1989, to Loni F. DeLand, at torney for defendant, a t 132 South 
600 East , Sa l t Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Robert V. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0 . Box 128 
Coalvi l le , Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
P la in t i f f , : OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
vs : 
JOHN T. MURPHY, : Criminal No. 1220 
Defendant. : 
P la in t i f f , through i t s a t torney, Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attorney, 
objects to defendant 's Motion to Compel Discovery for the following reasons: 
. 1 . The Court has heretofore ruled against defendant in his attempt to 
suppress the r e s u l t s of the "search" conducted by Lee Ford on September 19, 
1988. The request for complete copies of manuals for The Packaging Store would 
serve no other purpose beyond that which the court has already ruled upon. 
P la in t i f f has already produced those par ts of the manual dealing with opening 
and inspecting packages. Nothing more i s needed. 
2. The manuals for The Packaging Store, which i s a nat ional franchise, are 
proprietary and the production of other par t s of the manual serves no 
legitimate purpose. 
3 . P l a in t i f f does not have possession of the manuals, and Lee Ford has 
expressed his unwillingness to produce the en t i re manuals because of their 
proprietary content. Accordingly, production should not be ordered under the 
foregoing circumstances. 
DATED this ^ 2 2 day of February, 1989. 
Summit County Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Objection to Defendants Motion to Compel Discovery, this ^ f^ day of 
February, 1989, to Loni F. DeLand, attorney for defendant, a t 132 South 600 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Robert W. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0 . Box 128 
Coalvi l le , Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 336-4458 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs 
JOHN T. MURPHY, 
Pla in t i f f , 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAT PIRRAGLIO 
Criminal No. 1220 
Sta te of Utah ) 
ss . 
County of Summit ) 
Pat P i r r a g l i o being f i r s t duly sworn on oath deposes and says: 
1. That I am employed as a Detective with the Park City Police Department. 
2 . That I am the officer tha t a r res ted the defendant, John T. Murphy, for 
the charges tha t are presently before the Court. 
3 . I have reviewed the a l l ega t ions contained in Paragraph No. 1 of 
Defendant's Motion for Rehearing dated September 13, 1988. Defendant i s 
implying in those a l legat ions tha t Lee Ford has been attempting to purchase 
narcot ics for the Park City Police Department. 
4. The a f f i an t has reviewed the a l l ega t ions with h i s superiors in the 
Park City Police Department, and nei ther the a f f i an t nor h is superiors have any 
knowledge of those purchases being made or attempted. The a f f ian t believes 
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that the allegations contained in Paragraph No. 1 of Defendant's Motion for 
ReHearing did not occur. 
DATED this ^ ? ^ day of 3+&- , 1989. 
PAT PIRRAGLIO 
SWORN to before roe this if**- day of JijJL. , 1989. 
. / V ^ / ^ ^ Lt^MaJz 
"NOTARY PUBLIC, residing at 
My commission expires: /0-J}0 -?d 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit of Pat Pirraglio, postage prepaid, this J<ar"tu day of 3>JI&. 
1989, to Loni F. DeLand, attorney for defendant, a t 132 South 600 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102. 
Qxf, A M,^ )ff £JW/toJfo*ck. 
Robert W. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0 . Box 128 
Coalvi l le , Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs 
JOHN T. MURPHY, 
Pla in t i f f , 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LOUIS A. STEVENS 
Criminal No. 1220 
State of Utah ) 
: s s . 
County of Summit ) 
Louis A. Stevens, being f i r s t duly sworn on oath deposes and says: 
1. That he i s employed as a Lieutenant with the Summit County Sher i f f ' s 
Department. 
2. That on September 20, 1988, the a f f i an t a s s i s t ed the Park City Police 
Department in stopping and a r res t ing the defendant, John T. Murphy. Following 
the defendant's a r r e s t , the defendant's wife, Jeanne Murphy, was asked by other 
police off icers in the a f f i a n t ' s presence, i f she would consent to a search of 
her vehicle tha t ted been driven by the defendant. Mrs. Murphy responded tha t 
she would have to ask her husband. 
3 . The defendant then said he might as well show us what we were looking 
for , because i f he did not, we would simply obtain a search warrant for the 
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vehicle. The defendant then went to the vehicle owned by his wife, and 
retrieved a green leafy substance therefrom which was later identified by a 
toxicologist as being marijuana• 
4. After that Mrs. Murphy signed the attached Consent to Search form, and 
the affiant and other police officers searched the vehicle. During that 
search, additional marijuana was discovered in the vehicle. 
DATED this ,3 *•/*** day of February 1989. 
o 
. 1 . ^ ^ 1 JL -J/\t-
\LOUIS A. STEVENS, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before tie this 3*/** day of February, 1989. 
NOTARY PUBLIC, residing a t 
My commission expires: /d ~J>0 ~ ^O 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit of Louis A. Stevens, postage prepaid, this jyrx- day of February, 
1989, to Loni F. DeLand, attorney for defendant, a t 132 South 600 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102. 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, 
v. ; 
JOHN T. MURPHY, 
Defendant. 
i MOTION FOR REHEARING 
i Case no. 1220 
Defendant, through counsel/ Loni F. DeLand, moves this 
Court to reconsider Defendant's Motion to Suppress (per his 
arguments as to the agency between Lee Ford and the Park City 
Police Department and the issue of consent regarding search of 
the vehicle); which Motion was denied at an earlier hearing on 
J<y*fary 6, 1989. 
This motion is based on Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the facts and the lav;, as follows: 
1. Defendant has recently discovered, through inves-
tigation, that during the relevant time periods, Lee Ford was 
purportedly attempting narcotics purchases in local taverns, 
which fact, if true, is indicia of Mr. Ford's greater and 
multifaceted relationship with the police and Defendant should be 
allowed to cross-examine him on point. 
2. In denying Defendants motion as to "consent" the 
court referred to the "consent form" as one basis; however, said 
form was not in evidence nor did the state offer any evidence to 
meet their burden of proof on the issue. Defendant herewith 
attaches said "consent form" which was signed involuntarily as 
well as after the search had born fruit as alleged previously. 
3. Further, in the event of a rehearing on these 
matters, Defendant requests a ruling on his accompanying Rule 16 
motion so as to enable preparation for examination of Lee Ford 
from requested materials. 
DATED this /3 day of February, 1989. 
LONI F. DeLAND 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /^ February, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attor-
ney's Office, P.O. Box 128, Coalville, Utah 841f7. 
mm 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 1 
JOHN T. MURPHY, 
Defendant. 
I MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 
I PER RULE 16 
Case no. 1220 
Defendant, through counsel, Loni F. DeLand, and pursu-
ant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, attaches a 
self-explanatory letter from State's counsel denying requested 
discovery and moves this Court for an order compelling the same 
as being essential to cross-examination of Lee Ford's search (of 
Defendant's package), motive or motivation, he having first 
raised the "following policies and procedures" claim at prelimi-
nary hearing but thereafter supplying only partial portions 
thereof and presently refusing to supply the remaining portions. 
DATED this / ^  day of February, 1989. ^ 
LONI F. DeLAND 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /'? February, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to Robert W. Adkins, Summit County Attor-






Robert W. Adkins #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
Sunmit County Courthouse 
P. 0 . Box 128 
Coalvil le , Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for P l a in t i f f 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
vs : AND DISMISS 
JOHN J . MURPHY, : Criminal No. 1220 
Defendant, : 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
P la in t i f f supplements and c l a r i f i e s the Statement of Facts contained in 
defendant's Memorandum in the following pa r t i cu l a r s : 
1. After issuance of the Search Warrant by Judge Murphy, police off icers 
went to the defendant's residence and executed the Search V/arrant. No one was 
hone a t the t i ne . The off icers recovered the Federal Express Receipt/Air Bi l l 
for the package which the defendant had shipped from the store in Park City. 
Also recovered v/ere approximately 1J pounds of marijuana, cash, and records 
ref lec t ing defendant's drug t raf f icking. The off icers l e f t a copy of the 
Search Warrant and a Receipt on the premises. 
2. A Summit County She r i f f ' s Deputy la te r observed the defendant and his 
wife in the v ic in i ty of the defendant 's home, and stopped defendant's vehicle. 
Detective P i r rag l io arr ived and ar res ted the defendant for Distr ibut ion of a 
, * • • > 
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Controlled Substance. Following the defendant's a r r e s t , the off icers asked 
Mrs. Murphy for permission to search the vehicle. Mrs. Murphy asked the 
defendant what she should do, and the defendant repl ied tha t she might as well 
give them permission to search because thsy_ would simplv get a search warrant yOivri^ 
i f she did not, Mr. Murphy volunteered that he might a s well show the off icers 
//Ufa 
where the marijuana was, and he did so. A wri t ten Consent to Search form was 
signed by Mrs. Murphy. Officers continued to search the vehicle and recovered 7 : £ G 
more marijuana. The defendant volunteered that he ted forgotten that that 
marijuana was in the vehicle. Approxinately 1/2 pound of marijuana was 
recovered from the vehicle. 
3 . Following the defendant 's a r r e s t , marijuana and a marijuana pipe were 
found on the defendant's person ^y'lhe^pDlice officers^ _^ / j j / r V 
4. During the approximately two year>-xh^t Lee Ford has operated the 
"Handle With Care Packaging S to te" , he has/discovered four packages that 
contained controlled substances. Twooccurred prior to the present occasion 
and the fourth occurred on the same day. Suspects teXTe not been apprehended on 
the two prior occasions, but on the fourth occasion, a Park City Residence, 




DEFENDANT' HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED 
BY LEE FORD WAS UNLAWFUL 
The pa r t i e s disagree as to who has the burden of proof regarding the search 
conducted by Lee Ford. Defendant claims that "once defendant has produced some 
evidence, then the burden sh i f t s to the State to prove the l ega l i ty thereof." 
(Defendant's Memorandum, page 10). Defendant c i t e s Aldernan vs the United 
Sta tes , 394 US 165 and Beck vs Ohio , 379 US 89, to support tha t argument. 
Defendant's re l iance on those cases i s misplaced. F i r s t , in Alderman v the 
United Sta tes , supra , defendant was convicted of Conspiring to Transmit 
Murderous Threats in In t e r s t a t e Commerce. The i l l e g a l search in that case 
involved a wiretap by federal officers without j u d i c i a l author izat ion. 
Beck vs Ohio , supra , dea l t with an a r r e s t without a warrant and without 
probable cause. Neither case cited by defendant has anything to do with a 
search by a pr ivate person who i s alleged to be an "agent" of the pol ice . 
Both cases c i ted by defendant are dis t inguishable and do not apply to the 
fac ts of t h i s case. Defendant has ignored the recent decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court which c lear ly lroldsjagainst the pos i t ion being advocated by 
defendant. That case i s [State vs Watts , 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 (1988))which 
dea l t with whether an informant was act ing as a government agent when he 
searched the defendant 's premises. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that he was 
not ac t ing as a police agent, and that case wi l l be dea l t with in more de ta i l 
in Argument I I I . However, \fatts , supra , c l ea r ly s e t s out which party has 
the burden of proof. The Utah Supreme Court held: 
/ The burden of es tabl i sh ing governmental involvement in a private 
search r e s t s upon the party objecting to the evidence. Ld . , a t 1221. 
United Sta tes vs Snowadzki , 723 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Circui t ) c e r t 
denied 469 U.S. 839(1984), reached exactly the same conclusion. 
I I 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE HAVE NO APPLICATION TO ACTS OF PRIVATE PERSONS. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United S ta tes Const i tut ion which protects 
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a^ i in s t unreasonable searches and seizure only app l i es to protect individuals 
from unreasonable governmental ac t ions . Tte Fourth Amendment has no 
appl icat ion to searches and seizures conducted by pr ivate individuals and does 
not p ro tec t aga ins t private t respasses. Burdeau v. McDowell , 256 U.S. 465, 
41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048(1921); U.S. v.DeLafunte , 548 F.2d 528 (5th 
Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Jacobsen , 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed 2d 85 
(1984). 
Tte Utah Supreme Court in State v. Watts , 76 Adv. Rep. 3 , 750 P.2d 1219 
(1988) recognized that t t e protection afforded by both the United States and 
Utah Consti tut ion does not apply to searches and seizures conducted by private 
individuals . Tte Court specif ical ly s ta ted : 
Tte fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and 
seizures protec ts only against governmental ac t ions and does not 
extend to the independent ac t s of pr ivate c i t i z e n s . _Id . , a t 1220. 
Based on t t e foregoing, unless i t can be es tabl ished that t t e search 
conducted by Lee Ford when he opened defendant 's package was inst igated or 
par t ic ipated in by t t e Park City Police Department, t t e marijuana i s admissible 
in to evidence and defendant's Motion to Suppress should be denied. 
I l l 
LEE FORD DID NOT OPEN DEFENDANT'S PACKAGE AS A GOVERNMENT AGENT 
To e s t ab l i sh tha t t t e actions of Lee Ford in opening defendant's package 
cone within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, defendant would have to show 
Mr. Ford was ac t ing as an agent of the Park City Police Department. In State 
v. Watts , supra , the Utah Supreme Court spec i f ica l ly addressed the issue 
whether a pr iva te person has conducted a search as a governmental agent. Watts 
was a r res ted for unlawful possession and production of nariouana af ter an 
informant ted advised a Provo City Police Officer tha t Watts had a make-shift 
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greenhouse containing marijuana p lan t s in a shed behind h i s residence. This 
information was used to obtain a search warrant which resul ted in seizure of 
numerous marijuana p lants . Watts moved to suppress the evidence seized arguing 
t t e t the informant was an agent of the Provo Police Department who had 
unlawfully entered defendant's property. The informant had been told by the 
Provo Police Department tha t i f he provided them information leading to a 
prosecutable case, criminal charges aga ins t him would be dismissed. The Court 
provided the following guidelines in addressing the agency issue: 
Two c r i t i c a l areas of inquiry have been ident i f ied which bear 
upon the determination of whether a pr ivate person or body has 
conducted a search as a governmental agent: (1) The govexnmept's 
Ifflowledge of and acauiesence in the in t rus ive conduct, and (2) the 
in t en t and purpose of the person(s) or body(ies) conducting the 
search. Id . , a t 1221, 1222. 
Applying the foregoing c r i t e r i a , the Court determined tha t the "offer" 
given to the informant was far too vague and general to const i tu te government 
knowledge of the search conducted by the informant. The informant was not 
given specif ic d i rec t ions , and the pol ice did not exercise control over his 
a c t i v i t i e s . Further, the Court concluded the informants act ions were for the 
most pa r t h is own, and were not subs tan t ia l ly motivated by promptings and 
encouragement of the Provo Police Department. Accordingly, the Court upheld 
the seizure of evidence. 
Applying the two areas of inquiry addressed in Watts , i t i s apparent tha t 
Lee Ford was not act ing as an agent for the Park City Police Department when he 
opened defendant 's package. The Park City Police Department was not aware t ha t 
Lee Ford opened defendant's package u n t i l a f te r the search was completed. 
Lee Ford was not encouraged or directed by the Park City Police Department or 
any other governmental author i ty , to open packages where he suspected drugs may 
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be shipped. On the two pr ior occasions, when Lee Ford discovered drugs in 
packages, Detective Ford spec i f ica l ly indicated to her husband tha t she could 
not advise him what to do, but referred him to h i s company's hone office to 
determine what the i r guidelines were under these circumstances. Accordingly, 
there i s no evidence tha t the government knew or acquiesced in the opening of 
packages where drugs were suspected. The in ten t and purpose of Lee Ford in \ 
opening defendant's package was to protect h is business because he did not wanf; 
to be implicated in any i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y . Based on an analysis of the c r i t i c a l 
areas of inquiry designated by the Utah Supreme Court, Lee Ford was not act ing 
as a government agent and the marijuana found in defendant's package should not 
be suppressed. 
The factual circumstances in t h i s case are not unique and numerous courts 
have addressed similar issues under almost ident ica l circumstances. Absent any 
d i r ec t police involvement, the courts have generally refused to suppress drugs 
confiscated as a r e su l t of a pr ivate search. 
I rT^Jni teTstei tes v. Valen ,~479 F.ld 467 (1973), (3rd Cir. 1973)1 two 
sui tcases were l e f t a t Emery Airfreight Corporation for shipping. An employee 
of Enery opened the su i t cas^s^nddi^covered them to be ful l of rarijuana af ter 
he smelled the odor of/^arijuana emanating from the bag££ge. The employee then 
contacted an agent with U. S. Customs And advised him of the marijuana srrell. 
The customs agent was noxN^dvised t r a t the employee had previously opened the 
sui tcases and discovered marijuana. Nonetheless, the agent opened the 
sui tcases and a Motion to Suppress was f i led . The Court denied defendant's 
Motion to Suppress on the bas is of "exigent circumstances". The signifigance 
of the case i s the Court ' s discussion of whether the Emery employee was an 
agent for the government. Defendant argued tha t the Emery employee (Thompson) 
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was a government agent based on h is receiving $100.00 for t t e information 
supplied aga ins t Valen and $375.00 for similar information provided in a pr ior 
case. The Court, in addressing the issue of agency, s t a t ed : 
...•We are sa t i s f i ed tha t the minimal contacts between Thompson and 
the government do not make out a prima facie case of government 
pa r t i c ipa t ion in Thompsons search. 
^^-^^nlrcumstances are not present here as exis ted in Corngdld^VT-^ 
CUnited S ta tes . 367 F . 2 d 1 j ^ ^ " 
search by an a i r l i n e employee was conducted a t t t e request and under 
the supervision of government agents. Thompson was requested to do no 
more than report suspicious parcels ; no attempt was made hv-t te 
government to use him to do tha t which the agents themselves were 
forbidden to do. Thompson's testimony fully supports the cour t ' s 
conclusion that? his search was conducted solely as a pr ivate party in 
order to p ro tec t himself and his employer, Emery. 
A case very similar to the present fact s i tua t ion i s U.S. vs Koenig 856 
F.2d 843 (7th C i r . , 1988). In t t e Koenig case, on July 17, 1986, a Federal 
Express Securi ty Spec ia l i s t , Jerry Zito, was a t the V/est Palm Beach Federal 
Express S ta t ion . While there , he conducted a visual inspection of packages 
received a t the Federal Express Station and detected an odor of laundry soap 
or fabr ic softener emanating from one of t t e boxes. (The Court noted that 
cocaine i s often packed in laundry products to rrask i t s smell .) His cur ios i ty 
piqued, Zito checked the telephone directory and found no l i s t i ng for the 
shipper of record. He inquired of another employee about the address the 
shipper had given and was informed that i t was f i c t i t i o u s . Zito opened the 
package. Inside wrapped in fabric softener sheets , he found two transparent 
p l a s t i c bags containing white powder. He contacted the local D.E.A. Office, 
and an agent responded and f ie ld tested the powder. Tte t e s t indicated 
cocaine. The D.E.A. in coordination with Federal Express, performed a 
controlled del ivery of t t e package to the intended rec ip ien t . At i t s terminus, 
in Peoria, I l l i n o i s , t t e package was opened for t t e l a s t of many times, jo in t ly 
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by a federal agent, a member of the I l l i n o i s Police and a Federal Express 
employee. Tte package was then delivered, according to i t s address, to the 
residence of the defendant Koenig. Shortly afterward, the D.E.A. obtained and 
executed a search warrant on the residence and seized several items including 
t t e package. Koenig was arres ted on the premises, and was indicted along with 
o thers , with Conspiracy to Distr ibute Cocaine, Possession of Cocaine, and 
Attempting to Possess Cocaine With Intent to Dis t r ibu te . Koenig moved to 
suppress the evidence found in t t e package arguing tha t i t was t t e f ru i t of an 
i l l e g a l search. After t t e Motion to Suppress was denied, Koenig entered a 
conditional plea of gu i l ty , conditioned upon a r igh t to appeal t t e denial of 
t t e suppression motion. Tte Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and in so 
doing addressed Koenig?s contention tha t Federal Express employee Zito was 
ac t ing as a de facto instrument or agsnt of t t e government a t the time of t t e 
search. In order to attempt to es tab l i sh tha t agency re la t ionship , Koenig 
argued tha t Federal Express lacked a ' su f f i c i en t l y compelling private i n t e r e s t 
in opening packages i t suspects to contain drugs. Additionally, since Zito 
beg^n h i s employment with Federal Express, he had contacted the D.E.A. a t l e a s t 
8 times apparently regarding drugs that he had found in Federal Express 
shipments. Zito had t e s t i f i ed in two pr ior D.E.A. criminal cases. The 
D i s t r i c t Court found, however, tha t Zito never worked as an informant for t t e 
D.E.A., had never been rewarded by t t e D.E.A. for h is a id , nor even discussed 
with law enforcement au thor i t i es what to look for in Federal Express 
shipments. Koenig a l so introduced an a f f idav i t showing contact between Federal 
Express and t t e D.E.A. a t t t e national leve l . Representatives from tit/0 D.E.A. 
offices apparently net with Federal Express personnel to a s s i s t in t t e 
development of a drug shipper 's p ro f i l e . Tte Court of Appeals held that 
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Federal Express had a corporate policy to pro tec t i t s employees from a l l types 
of criminal a c t i v i t y by opening and inspecting packages. Federal Express1 
Corporate Policy a lso provided for the opening and inspection of packages on a 
random and periodic basis and for contacting the a u t h o r i t i e s i f a controlled 
substance i s found. The Court affirmed the defendant 's conviction, and held: 
. . . P r i v a t e ca r r i e r s need not be t rea ted as governmental agents unless 
i t can be established tha t they ara-^rriauced to conduct a pr ivate "—^ 
search by some government action.( Cf. Coolidge , 403 U.S. a t 488-89, N 
91 S.Ct. a t 2049 (voluntary cooperation with police by pr ivate ^S* 
individual does not of i t s e l f , cons t i tu te-a-search and--;5Gizure}r~^Tbe 
social po l ic ies pursued by the government wi l l often coincide with the 
social ideals of many pr ivate persons; the coincidence of these goals 
f a l l s short of es tabl ishing tha t the pr ivate persons are controlled by 
the government. Quite the contrary, i t i s a re f lec t ion of our 
democratic system in proper working order, the government act ing as 
agent of the people. Private p a r t i e s may, of the i r own accord, pursue 
the same objectives they have s e t for thei r e lected o f f i c i a l s without 
acquiring the leg^l s ta tus of governmental agent. Consequently, once 
the court i s sa t i s f ied tha t a pr ivate en t i ty has conducted a search 
for i t s own, private reasons and not as an instrument or agent of the 
government, the specif ic reason for the search no longer matters. A 
company my conduct a search for securi ty reasons or simply out of i t s 
own i n t e r e s t in combatting crime, as long as the reason for the search 
i s not circumscribed by the cons t i tu t ion . Jacobsen , 466 U.S. a t 
113, 104 S.Ct. a t 1656; Coolidge , 403 U.S. a t 487-90,91 S.Ct. a t 
2048-49. 
Application of the correc t rule in the future wi l l avoid what we 
perceive as the fundamental flaw in Koenig!s argument; according to 
Koenig, the government should have been required to prove that Federal 
Express had no in tent to a s s i s t in the government's enforcement of the 
criminal laws to avoid having Federal Express deemed i t s agent. But, 
of course, i t i s every c i t i z e n ' s c ivic duty to do what he can to aid 
in the control and prevention of criminal a c t i v i t y , and " i t i s no pa r t 
of the policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
discourage c i t i zens from aiding to the utmost of the i r a b i l i t y in the 
apprehension of cr iminals ." Coolidge , 403 U.S. a t 488, 91 S.Ct. a t 
2049. 
IV 
THE PARK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT ACTED LAWFULLY IN TAKING POSSESSION 
OF THE PACKAGE FROM LEE FORD 
Defendant argues that the Park City Police could not "seize" the package 
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from Lee Ford without f i r s t obtaining a search warrant; as authori ty for tha t 
posi t ion, defendant ci t^sr^U.S. vs Kelly , 549 F.2d, 1365 (8th Circui t 1986). 
I t i s in te res t ing to note tha t in t t e recitation"lDT"fa"<^s~Te^Ming the Kelly 
case, tha t the defendant refers to the material seized simply as i l l e g a l 
mater ial . The decision in Kelly turned upon the seized material being books 
which are presumptively protected by the F i r s t Amendment. The Court of Appeals 
from the language used, would have obviously reached a dif ferent conclusion had 
the material seized been i l l e g a l drugs. The Court in Kelly said: 
I t i s well established tha t under cer ta in circumstances the 
police nay seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. Harris 
v. United Sta tes , supra , 390 U.S. a t 236, 88 S.Ct. 992. Because of 
the nature of the property seized in the in s t an t case, however, the 
seizure cannot be ju s t i f i ed on the basis of the plain view exception. 
"A seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one se t t ing may be 
unreasonable in a d i f ferent se t t ing or with respect to another kind of 
material . Roaden v. Kentucky 413 U.S. 496, 501-03, 95 S.Ct 2796, 
2800, 37 L.Ed.2d 757(1973). Tte Fourth Amendment should be read in 
conjunction with the F i r s t Amendment, rather than "in a vacuum." 
Id . The proper seizure of books and magazines, which are 
presumptively protected by the F i r s t Amendment, demands a greater 
adherence to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Roaden v. 
Kentucky , supra , 413 U.S. a t 504,93 S.Ct. 2796; A Quantity of 
Books v. Kansas , 378 U.S. 205, 212, 84 S.Ct. 1723, 12 L.Ed.2d 
809(1964); Wilhelm v. Turner , 298 F. Supp. 1335, 1337 
(S.D.Iowa 1969), a f f ' d , 431 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir . 1970), cer t , 
denied, 401 U.S. 947, 91 S.Ct. 919, 28 L.Ed.2d 230 (1971). As the 
Supreme Court s tated in Roaden v. Kentucky , supra : 
The seizure of instruments of a crime, such as a p i s to l or a 
knife, or " contraband " or stolen goods or objects dangerous 
in themselves," are to be distinguished from quant i t i es of 
books and movie films when a court appraises the reasonableness 
of the seizure under Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment standards . 
Id . , a t 1372 (Enphasis added) 
Defendant has misconstrued the Supreme Court decision of Walter v. United 
Sta tes , 447 U.S. 649, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980). In the Walter case, a dozen 
cartons of motion p ic tures were shipped by pr ivate ca r r i e r from Florida to 
Georgia. The cartons were mistakenly delivered to a company other than the 
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addressee, which opened the cartons and found tha t they contained individual 
boxes of film, each of which bore a drawing suggestive of homosexuality and a 
descript ion of the film indicat ing tha t i t depicted homosexual a c t i v i t y . The 
F.B.I , was contacted and took custody of the f i lms. The f i lms, which the 
employees had been unable to view with the naked eye because of the s ize of 
the f i lms, subsequently were viewed by F.B.I , agents who ran the films on a 
projector . The Supreme Court reversed the convict ion. Although unable to 
agree on an opinion, 5 members of the Court agreed tha t the Federal Agents 
viewing of the films without a warrant was improper. The Walter case, l ike 
the Kelly case, i s dist inguishable by i t s f a c t s ; both apply to seizure of 
al legedly obscene mater ia l , n o t j i c u g s ^ / 
Defendant has ci/6ed U.S. v. Jacobsen , 466 U.S., 109, 80 L.Ed.2d 85, 104 
S. Ct. (1984) for / the proposition tha t the substance from the package can be 
f ie ld tes ted , but i t cannot be seized without a war/rant. That was not the 
holding of Jacobsen. In Jacobsen , employees of Federal Express in 
Minneapolis examined a package tha t had beenyrorn by a f o r k l i f t . The employees 
opened the package \n order to examirie^lts contents . Inside the box were 
pieces of crumpled newspaper covering a tube about 10 inches long; the tube was 
made of s i lve r tape used on basement ducts . The employees cut open the tube 
and found a s e r i e s of 4 ziplock p l a s t i c bags, containing a white powder. The 
employees not i f ied the Drug Enforcement Administration. Before the D.E.A. 
arr ived, the employees replaced the p l a s t i c bags in the tube and put the tube 
and the newspapers back in the box. The D.E.A. agents saw tha t one end of the 
tube had been s l i t open, and he removed the 4 p l a s t i c bags from the tube and 
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saw the white powder. He then opened each of the 4 bags and removed a t race of 
the white sustance with a knife blade. A f ie ld t e s t made on the spot 
ident i f ied the substance as cocaine. The D.E.A. agent rewrapped the package 
and obtained a warrant to search the place to which the package was addressed. 
Jacobsen was arres ted when the warrant was executed. The Court of Appeals had 
reversed the conviction, holding that a warrant was required for the D.E.A. 
agent to t e s t the white powder. The Supreme Court granted ce r t i o r a r i and 
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. As counsel for the State reads 
the Jacobsen decision, i t appears tha t the Supreme Court in Jacobsen adopted 
the minority posi t ion in Walter , and arguably, Walter has been superseded 
by Jacobsen . The majority of the Court said: 
While the agent1 s asser t ion of dominion and control over the 
package and i t s contents did cons t i tu te a "se izure ," tha t seizure was 
not unreasonable. The fac t tha t pr ior to the f ie ld t e s t , 
respondents1 privacy i n t e r e s t in the contents of the package had been 
largely compromised, i s highly relevant to the reasonableness of the 
agents 1 conduct in t h i s respect . The agents had already learned a 
grea t deal about the contents of the package from the Federal Express 
employees, a l l of which was consis tent with what they could see. The 
package i t s e l f , which had previously been opened, remained unsealed, 
and the Federal Express employees had invited the agents to examine 
i t s content. Under these circumstances, the package could no longer 
support any expectation of privacy; 
Accordingly, since i t was apparent tha t the tube and p l a s t i c bags 
contained contraband and l i t t l e e l s e , th i s warrantless seizure was 
reasonable, for i t i s well s e t t l ed tha t i t i s const i tu t ional ly 
reasonable for law enforcement o f f i c i a l s to seize "effects" tha t 
cannot support a j u s t i f i ab l e expectation privacy without a warrant, 
based on probable cause to believe they contain contraband . 
In I State v. Gentry , 450 So.2d 773 (La.App. 5 Cir, 1984), a package sent 
for shipping was opened linder circumstances similar to the case a t bar. An 
employee of DHL Worldwide Courier Service noticed that an envelope did not 
conform to shipping specif ica t ions . In order to insure that the package which 
was addressed to a location in France met customs r e s t r i c t i ons , the employee 
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opened the package and discovered a p l a s t i c audio casse t te holder containing a 
white powdery substance. The D.E.A. was contacted and the substance was 
confiscated, analyzed and revealed to be cocaine. The Court in addressing the 
ac t ions of law enforcement a f te r the pr ivate search, s t a ted : 
We must next determine i f the subsequent "search" by Kenner 
Police off icers violated the provision of the Fourth Amendment. 
Governmental searches which follow a pr ivate search must be examined 
on i t s fac t s to determine i f i t v io la tes the Fourth Amendment. Once 
the pr ivate search reveals the item the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohib i t governmental use of the item as evidence. Walter v United 
Sta tes , 447 U.S. 649, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 65 L.Ed.2d 410~T1980); U.S. v 
Jacobsen ,—U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85. 
One of the elements necessary to cons t i tu te an unreasonable 
search i s the defendant 's expectation of privacy. Once the pr ivate 
search has revealed the item, the defendant's expectation of privacy 
surrounding his package has great ly diminished, i f not completely 
compromised. The employees of D.H.L. had already opened the casse t te 
package and exposed the package pr ior to contacting police o f f i c i a l s . 
Once the pr ivate search had revealed a white powdery substance, 
believed to be cocaine, the off icers did not v io la te any legi t imate 
expectation of privacy tha t would t r igger a v iola t ion of the Fourth 
Amandnent. U.S. v. Jacobsen , supra . _Id_. a t 776, 777. 
In the case a t bar, Lee Ford had already ident i f ied the substance being 
shipped by Defendant a s marijuana. Since Mr. Ford's pr ivate search had already 
revealed the item, no violat ion of Defendant's privacy occurred when the 
contraband was seized by the Park City Police Officers . 
V 
DETECTIVE PIRRAGLIO'S AFFIDAVIT WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT 
Detective P i r r a g l i o ' s Affidavit establ ished probable cause. Based upon 
tha t Affidavit , the D i s t r i c t Court issued a search warrant for b/o items: 
1. The Federal Express Receipt/Air B i l l , and 
2. Controlled Substances, i . e . , marijuana. 
At the t ine t t e search warrant was signed, Judge Murphy knew the following: 
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' l . That on the preceeding day, the defendant mailed a package that 
contained marijuana from The Packaging Store in Park City. 
2 . Defendant had taken with him the Federal Express Receipt/ Air Bi l l when 
he leftJtoe-Pstckaging Store . 
of the sender/defendant was dislosed by his telephone 
he had placed on the Federal Express form. 
4. That the Park City Police Department checked with U. S. V/est Communi-
cat ions and discovered tha t the phone number was l i s t e d to one Etta 
Place (also known as Jeanne Murphy, the defendant 's wife). 
A 
5. Detective P i r r ag l io checked with Lt . Stevens of the Summit 
„ 7 County Sher i f f ' s Departnent and confirmed tha t the defendant in fact 
^ y l ived a t tha t location in Hoytsvil le , Utah. 
ised upon the foregoing, i t was reasonable to conclude tha t the defendant 
/ 
had taken the Federal Express Air Bi l l /Receipt back to h is home in Hoytsville,/ 
and tha t he ted other controlled substances a t tha t same locat ion. 
— ^ -—. 
The leading United Sta tes Supreme Court decision in t h i s area i s I l l i n o i s 
v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 76 L.Ed.2d. 527. / i n Gates , a copy of an anonymous 
l e t t e r informing the police of the defendant 's al leged drug trafficking 
a c t i v i t i e s and d e t a i l s as to an alleged imminent t ransact ion was attached to 
the Affidavit for Search Warrant. The police had corroborating data_collected 
in an independent invest igat ion. The I l l i n o i s State Courts held that the 
l e t t e r and a f f idav i t were inadequate to sustain a determination of probable 
cause where the issuance of a Search Warrant. The United Sta tes Supreme Court 
reversed and in so doing held: 
For a l l these reasons, we conclude that i t i s wiser to abandon 
the "two-pronged t e s t " established by our decision in Aguilar and 
Spine H i . In i t s place we reaffirm the total i ty-of-the-circumstances 
analysis tha t t r ad i t i ona l ly has informed probable-cause 
determinations. See Jones v. United States , supra, United States v. 
Ventresca , 380 US 102, 13 L Ed 2d 684, 85 S Ct 741 (1965); Br ine^r 
v United Sta tes , 338 US 160, 93 L Ed 1879, 69 S Ct 1302 (1939). The 
task of the issuing magistrate i s simply to make a p r ac t i c a l , common-
sense decision whether, given a l l the circumstances s e t forth in the 
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a f f idav i t before him , including the "veraci ty" and "basis of 
knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there i s a fa i r 
probabi l i ty tha t contraband or evidence of a crime wi l l be found in a 
pa r t i cu l a r place . Id
 M a t 462 US 258. 
The a f f idav i t of Detective P i r rag l io es tab l i shes a " fa i r probability11 tha t 
contrabSnd^vidence would be found in the defendant 's residence. In U.S. 
v Valenzuela 1 596 F.2d 824 (9th Ci r . , 1979), the Court of Appeals concluded 
"that i t was/commonplace for drug dealers to have drugs in the place where they 
l i ve . The Court of Appeals sa id: 
i s a l so clear tha t in te rpre t ing a search warrant in the 
nsense and r e a l i s t i c fashion," United Sta tes v. 
380 U.S. a t 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, my r e su l t in the 
inference/Of probable cause to believe tha t criminaToB;j^cts are 
located/ in a pa r t i cu la r place to which they have not been tied by 
xdtree-tevidence. See, e . g . , United Sta tes v. Spearman ,! 532 F.2d 
132,133 (9th Cir/^197&Wper curiam) (a f f idavi t disclosed heroin sa les 
a t defendant 's /pafrtment,^ held, warrant for search of car va l id ) ; 
United Sta tes fr Lucarz, gbpra , 430 F.2d a t 1055^(affidavit gave 
probable caus^ to b e l i e f postal employee had s tolen content of mail 
pouch; held, warrant^for search of residence v a l i d ) . In the present 
case the a f f idav i t discloses that the informant ted seen del iver ies by 
Alonso several times, and tha t Blondie was able to get heroin from 
Alonso readi ly . The o f f i c e r ' s personal knowledge confirmed that 
Blondie was a dealer , permitting the reasonable inference that Alonso 
was an even higher level dealer. The off icer , ac t ing on the 
informant's t i p , saw Alonso leave h is house and drive to where the 
apparent narcot ics transaction witn Blondie took place . The opinion 
of the "affiant, an experienced narcot ics of f icer , t ha t there would be 
heroin on Alonso's person or in his house or car , i s but a 
par t icular ized restatement of the o f f i c e r ' s opinion in the af f idavi t 
in United Sta tes v. Spearman, supra , 532 F.2d a t 133, that " ' [ i t ] i s 
commonplace for dealers of heroin to have heroin tha t i s packaged for 
sale in the place where they live or s e l l from, in the i r vehicles or 
on the i r pe r sons . ' " . We find the a f f idav i t in the preseniTcSse-* 
suf f ic ien t to permit the inference that heroin would be found a t the 
time of search in the Lizarraga residence. 
l0vm 
The probable cause necessary to search need not rise to the level necessary 
to arrest. In U.S. v Melvin , 596 Fed 2d 492 (1st Cir., 1979) cert, denied 444 
US 387, the Court of Appeals held that insufficient evidence to arrest the 
defendant in connection with a bombing did not affect the probable cause 
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necessary to believe that f r u i t s , ins truman t a l i t i e s , or evidence of the crime 
might be secreted in the defendant's home. Defendant was convicted of 
possession of unregistered firearms. The guns were discovered and seized by 
police off icers during a search of defendant 's home pursuant to a warrant to 
search for evidence of the bombing. An unknown male, who had witnessed the 
explosion, s ta ted to the f i r s t police off icer on the scene that a white 
Cadillac had l e f t the scene moments before the explosion. Ear l ier that 
morning, the same police officer had noticed a white Cadillac parked in front 
of the tavern and a white male about 35 years , 5 feet 10 inches t a l l weighing 
180 pounds was standing a t the tavern ' s f ront door. The defendant was a white 
male, 34 years old, 5 feet 9 inches t a l l , 165 pounds and was l i s t ed as the 
owner of Rooney's Tavern and operated a white Cadi l lac . The Court of Appeals 
said: 
The fac t s reci ted in the a f f idav i t thus strongly pointed to 
appel lant as having played some role in the bombing. To jus t i fy the 
warrant authorizing the search of his house, the a f f idavi t must a l so 
have provided a reasonable basis to believe that the inst rumental i t ies 
of the crime sought by the police—wires, b las t ing caps, dynamite, \ yt/0 ^ 
crimping p l i e r s and other tools applicable to the making of a bomb—\
 <vppa 
might be found there. The a f f idav i t s ta ted in t h i s regard only t h a t / - * / ' 
the bomb used a t the tavern "would generally be assembled in a J 
workshop of some sor t , as opposed to in the vehicle, because of the 
type of tools and materials needed to assemble the bomb." Appellant 
claims tha t tha t supposition does not create a reasonable basis for 
believing tha t the ins t rumental i t ies sought were present in 
appe l l an t ' s hone. 
While the question i s a close one, we believe i t was permissible 
for the issuing judge to infer tha t evidence or instrumental i t ies 
might be found in appe l lan t ' s home. 
The decisions of the Utah Supreme Court are consis tent with the foregoing 
federal cases.. In State v. Fort , 572 P.2d 1387 (1977), the Utah Supreme 
Court said tha t "probabili ty, no-fcia prima facie showing, of criminal ac t iv i ty" 
i s the standard of probable cause for issuance of a search Warrant. In State 
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(. Hansen/, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah, 1987), defendant argued t ha t the police 
o f f i c e r ' s a f f idav i t was inadequate to esabl ish probable cause for the search 
warrant. The court in re jec t ing defendant 's argument held: 
• / ^ 
Search wa r r an t^ f f i dav i t s are to be construed in a common-sense, 
reasonable manner,* S ta te ly . Williamson , 674 P.2d 132,133(Utah 
1983); State v / P u r c e l l , ^86 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978). Excessive 
technical dissect ion of an infora&ntTs t i p or of the nontechnical 
language in theVofficer 's a f f i dav i t i s i l l - s u i t e d to t h i s task. 462 
U.S. a t 231-32, ?35~^£>, 103 S.Ct. a t 2328-30, 2330-31. In Gates , 
the Supreme Court emphasized tha t an informants " r e l i a b i l i t y " and 
"basis of knowledge" are but two relevant considerat ions, among 
others , in determinng t t e existence of probable cause under "a 
total i ty-of- the-circumsiBnces." 462 U.S. a t 233-34, 103 S.Ct. a t 
2329-30. They are not s t r i c t , independent requirements to be 
" r ig id ly exacted" in every case. A weakness in one or the other i s 
not fa ta l to the warrant so long as in the t o t a l i t y there i s 
sus tan t i a l basis to find probable cause. Id. a t 230, 238, 103 S.Ct. 
a t 2328, 2332. The indicia of veraci ty , r e l i a b i l i t y , an£Lhasis_of 
knowledge are nonexclusive e lenents to be evaluated in reaching the 
p r ac t i ca l , common-sense decision whether, given a l l the 
circumstances, there i s a f a i r probabi l i ty tha t the contraband wi l l 
be found in the place described . (emphasis added) 
See a l so State v. (Jordan ^ 6 6 5 P.2d 1280(Utah 1983), to tYip^am e f fec t . 
The concurring opinion of Jus t i ce E l l e t t in State v.'.Treadway ,; 499 P.2d 
846, 849(1972) seems to have been wr i t ten for appl icat ion in the present case. 
In Treadway , the Suprema Court held tha t i t i s the probabi l i ty and not a 
prima facie showing of criminal a c t i v i t y as the standard for probable cause. 
The Suprene Court affirmed defendan t s conviction for possession of 
marijuana with in ten t to d i s t r i b u t e for value; Jus t ice E l l e t t concurred in 
the r e s u l t and added: 
I concur in the r e s u l t but desire to add tha t i t seems absolutely 
r idiculous to even think of turning a gu i l ty felon free because some 
appel late court thinks the rragisrate did not have any reason to believe 
tha t the fac ts in the a f f idav i t for a search w a r r a n t ^ e r ^ j r u e . There 
i s no question but what they were t rue . A search uncleir the warrant 
Irevealed exactly the a r t i c l e s sought to be found. 
In our case, the police recovered exactly the two items they were searching 
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for pursuant to the warrant. Those items were recovered from exactly the ~r * 
location specified in the warrant. The fac ts contained in the a f f idavi t 
established probable cause to search Mr. Murphy's hone for the two items 
found. 
Defendant claims tha t Lee Ford's r e l i a b i l i t y a s an infonrent was not 
a t t e s t ed to . The contents of the af f idavi t c l ea r ly s e t out the r e l i a b i l i t y of 
Mr. Ford: He i s the owner of the business in question in Park City. Mr. Ford 
found the marijuana and turned the marijuana over to the pol ice . As such, Mr. 
Ford cannot be considered a police informer, but ra ther as a c i t izen informer, 
who, "acts with an in ten t to aid the police in law enforcement or for his own 
safety; he does not expect any gain or concession for his information. *** The 
cour ts , therefore, t r e a t citizen-informers d i f fe ren t ly and their testimony i s 
not viewed with the r ig id scrutiny as i s the testimony of a police inforner ." 
State v. Treadway , supra , 848. 
Defendant complains tha t Detective P i r rag l io "reported only the hearsay 
relayed to him by Mrs. Ford." Defendant's br ie f page 22. As the court i s 
aware, hearsay can be used in the a f f idavi t . "An a f f idav i t nay be based on 
hearsay information and need not re f lec t the d i r e c t personal observation of the 
a f f i an t . So long as the ragistrate i s informed of sorre of the underlying 
circumstances supporting the conclusions." State v. Jordan , supra 1286. 
"In making a proteble cause determination, a police officer i s en t i t l ed to rely 
on information gained from other police of f icers : 'observations of fellow 
off icers of the government engaged in a common invest igat ion are pla inly a 
re l iable^bas is for a warrant applied for by one of the i r number'". State v. 
Dorsey , 731 P.2d 1085, 1098(19-8*). 
/ 
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ARGUMENT VI 
INCLUSION IN THE SEARCH WARRANT OF "NO KNOCK" PROVISIONS AND 
EXECUTION AT ANY TIME DAY OR NIGHT WAS PROPER 
The a f f idav i t executed by Detective P i r r a g l i o r e c i t e s tha t t t e search 
warrant be issued for the seizure of the items a t any time day or night because 
there i s reason to believe i t i s necessary to seize the property pr ior to i t 
being concealed, destroyed, damag2d, or a l t e r e d . Detective P i r rag l io further 
requested tha t the off icers not be required to give not ice of their authori ty 
because the property might be quickly destroyed or disposed of. Nothing more 
was required by Section 77-23-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. In the 
* r ! i \ present case, the defendant's shipping of drugs had occurred on the 19th, and 
fW the a f f idav i t was presented to the judge on the following day. Under the 
1
 circumstances, because of the nature of control led substances, and the persons 
tha t t r a f f i c in them, i t was essen t ia l tha t the warrant be executed as soon as 
possible whether i t was day or night . In the sane l i g h t , i t was appropriate 
tha t the "no knock" provisions be included, because controlled substances can 
be eas i ly and rapidly disposed of when the warrant i s executed. 
In State v, Miller , 740 P.2d 1363, 1367(Utah Court of Appeals, 1987), the 
Court of Appeals had occasion to review an a f f idav i t for search warrant tha t 
contained almost the exact languaga as i s found in Detective P i r r ag l io f s 
a f f idav i t . The Court of Appeals in affirming the denial of defendant's Motion 
to Suppress, held: 
In h i s a f f idav i t , Smith requested a "no knock" warrant because the 
marijuana p lan t s could be "quickly destroyed, disposed ol^jor 
secre ted ," and "[t]wo large watch dogs a re always present and might 
pose a hazard to a r res t ing o f f i c e r s . " We find the magistrate had a 
suf f ic ien t bas i s to jus t i fy a "no knock" warrant on e i the r of the two 
s ta tu tory grounds. 
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ARGUMENT VII 
THE OFFICERS DID NOT EXCEED THEIR SCOPE OF AUTHORITY 
IN EXECUTING THE SEARCH WARRANT 
Defendant argues that the items to be searched for in the warrant should 
have only been marijuana, rather than marijuana and "controlled substances". 
I t was apparent, tha t the defendant had engaged in drug trafficking by 
attempting to use Federal Express to del iver the controlled substance for him. 
I t was a l so reasonable to describe the control led substance which was being 
searched for by the speci f ic , being marijuana, as well as the generic being 
control led substances. However, i t i s not necessary for the court to consider 
tha t argument, because the only controlled substances seized were marijuana. 
Even i f the term "controlled substances" were str icken from the search warrant, 
the of f icers were cer ta in ly jus t i f i ed in seiz ing the controlled substances 
which they did, because the controlled substance that was seized was marijuana. 
Any other items seized were in plain view and were subject to seizure by 
the o f f ice rs . All of the items seized were found in the defendant's home, 
which was speci f ica l ly described in the warrant. While searching for the 
marijuana/controlled substance, the off icers came across the other items 
seized. ThosesJ/fcems were "seizable" pursuant to the plain view exception. In 
State v. Rorrero J660 P.2d, 715(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court addressed 
tt>e plainjyiew exception. In Romero , a police officer obtained a search 
warrant from the Circui t Court Judge authorizing tha search of the defendant 's 
residence for various business papers and re la ted objects. The search warrant 
l i s t ed 10 categories of evidence for seizure . The return of search warrant 
recorded a seizure of a t l e a s t 510 items of evidence. Many of the items seized 
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were covered by the search warrant, but some were not . Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress the evidence was denied. Following his conviction and appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court, the court discussed in de t a i l the requirements of the plain 
view exception. The court held: 
Warrantless seizures are unreasonable per se unless the 
exigencies of the s i tua t ion jus t i fy an exception. State v. Lee , 
Utah, 633 P.2d 48, 50, c e r t , denied, 454 U.S. 1057, 102 S.Ct. 606, 70 
L.Ed.2d 595(1981). One such exception a r i s e s when po l ice , while 
searching pursuant to a warrant, discover evidence in "plain view" 
tha t i s not l i s t ed in the warrant. In t h i s s i t ua t ion , a warrantless 
seizure i s j u s t i f i ed if: (1) the officer i s lawfully present where 
the search and seizure occur; (2) the evidence i s in pla in view; and 
(3) the evidence i s c lea r ly incriminating. 
* * * 
In t h i s case, the f i r s t condition of the exception i s sa t i s f i ed 
with respect to the seized evidence not l i s t ed in the warrant because 
the police were a t defendant 's residence pursuant to a val id search 
warrant and limited the i r search to the geographical areas delineated 
therein . The second condition was sa t i s f i ed since each item of 
evidence came in plain view while the off icers were executing the 
search prescribed in the warrant. The thi rd condition was sa t i s f i ed 
in tha t nearly every item not specif ica l ly l i s t e d in the Lewis 
warrant tetd e i the r an assumed name of defendant upon i t or the name 
of one of the business organizations through which defendant acted 
under an assumed name in transaction involving f a l s i f i ed documents. 
Id . , a t 717,718; 
As in Romero , the evidence seized from Mr. Murphy's hone meets the three 
t e s t s s e t out by the Utah Supreme Court. F i r s t , the of f icers were lawfully 
present where the search and seizure occurred, i . e . , they were there pursuant 
to the warrant to search for the marijuana /con t ro l l ed substances and the 
Federal Express Receipt/Air B i l l . Second, the evidence was in plain view, 
while executing the warrant. Third, the evidence was c l ea r ly incriminating, 
i . e . , drug paraphernalia, pr ice l i s t s of drugs, cash tha t was found in the sane 
area of the drugs, and correspondence that implicated defendant with controlled 
substances. 
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ARGUMENT VIII 
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS LAWFUL 
Because i t was unnecessary to go into the search of the vehicle, in order 
to es tab l i sh probable cause necessary for the Preliminary Hearing, there i s 
l i t t l e in the t r ansc r ip t regarding the vehicle search. After the search 
warrant had been obtained and the defendant's home searched, the defendant was 
stopped while driving a pickup truck belonging to h i s wife. After the stop by 
County Officers , Detective P i r rag l io arrived and a r res ted the defendant a t t t e 
scene. Following the defendant 's a r r e s t , the of f icers asked Mrs. Murphy i f 
t tey could search the vehicle . She indicated tha t she would have to ask her 
husband. At tha t point, the defendant volunteered tha t he would show the 
officers where the drugs were located in the vehicle. The defendant, a t tha t 
point, went to the vehicle and retr ieved bags of nari juana. Thereafter, Mrs. 
/ Murphy sigied__a_Consent to Search Form, and t t e of f icers searched t t e pickup 
/ truck. Tte off icers recovered addit ional marijuana from t t e truck, and upon 
| observing t t e off icers finding that addit ional nari juana, the defendant s tated 
i tha t he had forgotten tha t the marijuana was in t t e vehicle . 
\ There was sufficient probable cause to arrest tte defendant irrespective of 
\ 
\ any evidence obtained from t t e search of the defendant 's home, and the 
defendant was properly stopped and arrested for Dis t r ibut ion of a Controlled 
Substance tha t had occurred t t e previous day. 
ARGUMENT IX 
THE ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
SELF-INCRIMINATION PROVISIONS OF EITHER THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION OR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Defendant makes tte same argument here as has been previously rejected by 
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t h i s court in State of Utah v. Robinson and Towers , Sa l t Lake County Case 
No. CR-88932. The defendant in th i s case advances no argument that has not 
been already rejected in the Sa l t Lake County case . However, p l a i n t i f f wi l l 
respond to the issues raised by defendant. 
Defendant argues tha t his r igh t a^ t i n s t se l f - incr iminat ion i s violated by 
the I l l e ^ i l Drug Stamp Tax Act because: 
(1) The purchase of the stamp i t s e l f i s an admission of i l l e g a l 
a c t i v i t y ; and/or 
(2) Displaying the stamps on the irarijuana wi l l indicate knowledge 
tha t you are possessing marijuana, and therefore, i s a "link in 
a chain of evidence tending to e s t ab l i sh g u i l t . " 
The United S ta tes Supreme Court has es tabl ished a t e s t to determine whether 
or not a tax s t a tu t e v io la tes the Fif th Amendment r i g h t ag,ainst self-
incrimination, and thus makes penal t ies for non-compliance unenforceable. The 
t e s t cons is t s of three elements: 
(1) Whether the tax i s in an area permeated with penal laws and 
therefore directed towards a se lec t group inherently 
suspected of criminal a c t i v i t i e s ; 
(2) Whether, in order to comply with the tax one i s compelled to 
provide information which he might reasonably suppose to be 
avai lable to prosecuting au tho r i t i e s ; and, 
(3) Whether the compelled information i s such a s would surely 
prove a s igni f icant link in the chain of evidence tending 
to e s t ab l i sh g u i l t . 
I f any one of the three elements i s missing, there i s no Fif th Amendment 
v io la t ion . Cf. Leary v. U.S. , 395 U.S. 6 (1969); Marchetti v. U.S. , 390 
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U.S. 39 (1968). 
In t h i s case the second and th i rd elements are wholly lacking. Under the 
I l l e g a l Drug Stamp Tax Act, the taxpayer i s not compelled to give any 
in formt ion whatsoever, other than the quant i ty of stamps desired to be 
purchased. There i s no reg i s t ra t ion form or tax return that must be 
submitted. Complete anonymity i s afforded purchasers. The only requirements 
are tha t the tax amount be paid, and thereaf ter tha t the tax stamps be affixed 
to the control led substance. Cf. Section 59-19-105, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
a s amended. Therefore, the taxpayer cannot reasonably suppose that compelled 
information wll be available to prosecuting a u t h o r i t i e s or tha t compelled 
information wi l l surely prove a s ign i f ican t link in the chain of evidence 
tending to es tab l i sh g u i l t . 
Defendant further argues tha t the a c t of purchasing stamps a t the Tax 
Commission or otherwise obiBining them i s an admission of i l l ega l a c t i v i t y , and 
therefore, an a c t of self- incr iminat ion. However, the taxpayer i s not required 
to appear a t the Tax Commission nor i s anyone e l se required to appear. The 
only r e q u i r e m e n t s that the tax be paid. The stamps can be picked up by 
messenger service, cab company or any individual . A tax payer can combine a 
se r i e s of a s many of these steps as he des i res , and need supply no 
incriminatory information, not even as to h is physical appearance. Therefore, 
he i s not compelled to make any type of admission tha t could even remotely be 
characterized as self- incriminatory. 
In addi t ion , the third element i s lacking because there i s no compelled 
information which would prove a "s igni f icant l ink" in the chain of evidence 
tending to es tab l i sh gu i l t . The stamp i t s e l f says nothing of who did the 
purchasing or affixing. As already noted, the evidence as to who actual ly 
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purchased the stamp or affixed i t i s outside the s ta tu tory requirements. 
The United Sta tes Supreme Court has p la in ly s ta ted tha t fanciful or 
t r i f l i n g hazards of self- incriminat ion such a s those conjured up by Defendant 
do not r i s e to cons t i tu t ional s ignif icance: 
"The cent ra l standard for the p r i v i l e g e ' s appl icat ion has been whether 
the claimant i s confronted by substant ia l and rea l , and not merely 
t r i f l i n g or imaginary, hazards of incrimination ."/ Marchetti v. 
United States , 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968). (Emptesis added) 
V... ... 
The I l l e g a l Drug Tax Stamp Act does not impinge Defendant's F i f th Amendment 
r i g h t s . 
ARGUMENT X 
SECTION 5 9 - 1 9 - 1 0 1 , e t s e q . , UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1 9 5 3 , 
AS AMENDED, COMPORTS WITH SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Defendant's f ina l argument i s tha t the s t a tu te i s too vague for an 
individual to understBnd what conduct i s prohibited and i s so vague tha t law 
enforcement wi l l be a rb i t r a ry and discriminatory. Defendant s t a t e s the 
following syllogism to support h i s view: 
(1) Defendant had no d i rec t ions on where to place the stamps; 
(2) The a r res t ing of f icers could not know where to look for 
the stamps; and 
(3) Therefore, the opportunity for abuse and i l l e g a l a r r e s t s 
i s f lagrant , and the law inval id . 
As s ta ted in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees , 461 U.S. 352, a t page 357, (1983), 
a s t a tu te defining criminal conduct must " . . . . e n a b l e individuals to conform 
the i r conduct to the requirements of the law11 and not be so vague tha t 
" . . . pe r sons of common in te l l igence must guess a t i t s meaning and differ as to 
i t s appl ica t ion ." 
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Defendants argunent i s without merit because the s t a tu t e i s not vague. 
The tax i s "dijg and payable immediately upon acquis i t ion" or "possession" of 
"marijuana" or a "controlled substance" by a "dealer" . Cf. Section 599-19-
105(2), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. The terms "marijuana", 
"controlled substance" and "dealer" are spec i f ica l ly defined. To evidence 
payment of the tax the dealer i s required to immediately aff ix the tax stamp to 
the substance. No dealer may possess any m r i juana or controlled substance on 
which the tax i s imposed unless the tax has been paid as evidenced by a 
stamp. I f a dealer does possess such drugs without payment of the tax and 
affixment of the stamp, there i s a 100$ penalty provision. 
Defendant's questions as to where the stamps are to be placed, or how the 
off icers are going to know where to look for the sfeimps are p la inly answered by 
the s t a t u t e : you place the stamps on the marijuana or controlled substance. 
The off icers look on the marijuana or controlled substance. This i s where the 
s ta tu te says the sfeimps are to be affixed: 
When a dealer purchases, acquires, t ranspor ts , or imports into the 
s ta te marijuana or controlled substances, he she l l permnently af f ix 
the of f ic ia l indicia on the marijuana or control led substances 
evidencing the payment of the tax required under t h i s chapter. No 
stamp or other o f f i c ia l indicia may be used more than once. 
Section 59-19-105(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
In considering the cons t i tu t iona l i ty of s t a t u t e s , the courts are guided by 
cer ta in fundamental p r inc ip les . Foremost i s the pr inc ip le that every ac t of 
the leg is la ture ca r r i e s a strong presumption of cons t i t u t iona l i t y and wil l not 
be overturned unless there i s a clear and unmistakable conf l ic t with the 
Consti tution. Schwartz v. Talmo , 414 U.S. 803. The party challenging a 
s ta tu te has the burden of proving the s t a tu tes uncons t i tu t iona l i ty Madden v. 
Kentucky , 309 U.S. 83 (1940). 
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CONCLUSION 
Lee Ford opened defendant's package pursuant to h i s company's policy which 
provides t ha t any package which r a t t l e s or appears suspicious should be 
opened. Inasmuch as Mr. Ford opened the package as a pr ivate individual , the 
protect ion afforded by the Fourth Amendment aga ins t unreasonable search and 
seizure are not appl icable . Defendant has fa i l ed to meet his burden in showing 
tha t Lee Ford opened defendant's package as an agent of the' Park City Police 
Department. The fac ts in t h i s case f a l l far shor t of the circumstances in 
State v Watts , supra , where governmental involvement existed but the Court 
found the informant's act ions "were for the most pa r t h is own and were not 
subs tan t ia l ly motivated by the promptings and encouragement of the Provo Police 
Department". 
The Affidavit of Detective P i r rag l io es tab l i shed probable cause for 
issuance of the search warrant. The search of defendant 's home, pursuant to 
the warrant, uncovered exactly the' two items sought to be found. All other 
items seized were e i ther in p la in view and were contraband or "clearly 
incriminating" items that implicated defendant in drug traff icking. 
A s t a tu t e ca r r i e s a strong presumption of cons t i t u t iona l i t y . Defendant has 
fa i led to meet t ha t burden of proving tha t the I l l e g a l Drug.Stamp Tax Act i s 
unconst i tu t ional . 
Defendant's motions to suppress and dismiss should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Summit County Attorney 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Dismiss, postags 
prepaid, this / day of February, 1989, to Loni F. DeLand, attorney for 
defendant, a t 132 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN T. MURPHY, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO EXPAND LENGTH 
OF MEMORANDUM 
Case No. 1220 
Defendant, John T. Murphy, through counsel, Loni F. 
DeLand, moves the court for an informal order, without hearing, 
allowing the contemporaneously filed Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in support of his Motion to Suppress/Dismiss herein, 
to exceed the customary maximum number of pages for argument of 
Defendant's issues. 
The reasons therefore include the need to address five 
substantive constitutional issues extensively owing to the 
extreme jeopardy of Defendant, the novel issues raised under two 
rarely argued points (III and V) and the unusual circumstances of 
the case. 
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DATED this // day of January, 1989 
W F.V D'eLANU-' ^V. 
Attorney'for Defendant " \ ^ 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the // day of January, 
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LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRAE & DeLAND 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHN T. MURPHY, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
AS TO ALL COUNTS AND TO 
DISMISS COUNT III ON 
OTHER GROUNDS 
Case No. 1220 
Defendant, John T. Murphy, through counsel, Loni F. 
DeLand, and pursuant to Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, moves this Court for an order suppressing the evidence 
underlying all counts charged herein and additionally dismissing 
Count III on independent constitutional grounds. 
This motion is based upon the facts and the law set 
forth in the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 
DATED this // day of January, 1989, 
7T w / nof.aUTS JNI F / DeLAKC 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendant 
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. ! 
JOHN T. MURPHY, ] 
Defendant. 
i PRE-TRIAL RELEASE 
1 ORDER 
> Case No. 88-CR-152 
i Judge Maurice D. Jones 
The above named Defendant is hereby ordered release 
from custody pending further proceedings, no posting of bail or 
other sureties required; however, said Defendant shall be subject 
to any and all restrictions, terms and obligations which may be 
imposed upon him by Pre-Trial Services during said pendency, and 
to appear for all proceedings attendant hereto. 
DATED this 27th day of September, 1988,. 
MAURICE D. JONES 
Circuit Court Judge 
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